J&K: Time for strategic review

The general perception in the Indian public’s mind is that the abrogation of Articles 35A and 370 had led to a situation where the J&K issue is done and dusted. That is furthest from the truth although I believe it is currently advantage India, at least temporarily. While India has for the first time after 25 years aggressively opted to change the existing status quo, the triggers that it has caused have given rise to a series of fresh threats which it needs to take stock of. It was last on February 22, 1994, India messaged the world that all territories of J&K including those not under its direct control belonged to India and it would aspire to regain them. That was a unique case of political consensus when all parties came together in a Joint Parliamentary Resolution to stake India’s claims in the wake of aggressive diplomacy by US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael against India. Pakistan took advantage of that situation to press allegations of human rights violations and attempted to internationally take India to the cleaners; something which never ceased since then. 

In 25 years since 1994, India has attempted to change the strategy of dealing with J&K in any domain only twice. First was in 1996 with the return to democracy. The second was the secret backroom dialogue on the ‘four point formula’, from 2004 to 2007, with intent to territorially resolve J&K; it failed. Since 2008, there have been ups and downs but a policy resolve towards the adoption of fresh strategy has been elusive, until now.  The decision to adopt proactive military response without a Pakistani military initiative was taken in 2002; it did then and has continued to keep Pakistan under pressure. Why the status quo ruled the roost was due to there being governments in New Delhi and Srinagar which remained happy at that as long as the security situation remained under control. The Separatist leadership led their lives with full government support. The government had the fond hope that it could one day do a ‘Mizoram’ with them; militants coming over ground, fighting elections and forming the government. To be frank, the one time both Article 370 and 35A could have been done away with and the people of J&K brought on board towards full integration was after the victory of 1971. Kashmir may have reacted with turbulence for some time but with Pakistan cut to size and 93,000 prisoners of war in India, there could have been nothing better.

The Government of India is hopefully aware of the fact that the major issue due to which an impasse has existed this long in J&K, has been the absence of strategic policy which has forced the security forces too to follow a policy of summer and winter strategies without ever looking at the larger picture and having a strategic aim. The recent statements by the Raksha Mantri, Shri Rajnath Singh, on PoK and No First Use in the nuclear domain may not be policy statements but do indicate a change in mindset towards a clearer strategy. However, for the short term, India has to cater to increased Pakistani efforts towards internationalisation and upping the ante through high-profile terror acts. The feasibility of street turbulence at high pitch appears comparatively low. The efforts to control the latter many times compromise the pace and effectiveness of counter-terrorist operations. 

As the government readies itself for what could be a temporary phase of violence through enhanced attempted infiltration and street turbulence, it needs to continue to build a long-term strategy.  This should aim at emasculating Pakistani capability of calibration and neutralise the efforts at internationalisation through high levels of diplomatic and intellectual engagement. Second, it must equally focus on PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan taking a cue from the Raksha Mantri; these cannot remain one-off personal utterances. Third, of which the first portents seem to be emerging, remains the necessity of getting the civil administration to have a self-belief that this proxy war is not just the business of the Army, JK Police and CAPFs; it’s a hybrid proxy war which needs to be addressed comprehensively. Seeing the J&K Chief Secretary and Principal Secretary Home giving media briefs appears to spell for me a change in tack. That is the way forward. 

There are four other things which fall in the strategic domain. First is human rights (HR). Peaceful protest is very much a right but vicious stone-throwing does not fall in that category. There is going to be a manipulated assault on India in the domain of HR internationally. I sense it and can only recall the strategy of political consensus as the best response; who can forget the face of Atal Bihari Vajpayee leading the Indian delegation to the first ever UNHRC conference at Geneva in Jun 1994.

The second is the dire necessity to continue with even greater vigour  the targeting of the ecosystem or nexus which has come to dictate terms in Kashmir. Especially finances, media, separatist rabble-rousers and radical members of the clergy require a separate campaign under the aegis of people who understand the nuances. 

Third is intense information warfare with ‘fake news’ becomes the core of the Pakistan strategy. Countering this with existing machinery is a losing battle because Pakistan has developed its propaganda machinery rather well. Ours must not be an incremental approach towards developing the counter machinery; it cannot be ad hoc anymore and needs structures more than ever before. 

Fourth and last is the need for a strategic ‘hearts and minds’ campaign but not the Operation Sadbhavana variety of the Indian Army, which incidentally delivered hugely where it needed to deliver, at the tactical level. Now is the time for involvement of the state in entirety, every department and every element of the administration has to join the effort towards engagement with the populace. Town hall types of meetings to resolve pending issues, youth engagement schemes, women empowerment, intra-state contacts with Jammu division, mutual adoption of towns of the Valley with those of Jammu, seminars and meetings between like-minded professionals. The scope is only limited by our imagination and inability to inspire commitment.  

A broad strategy must be evolved and tweaked as we progress because without it crisis time may loom ahead and arrive faster than we can imagine. 

The author commanded the 15 Corps in J&K