Inside Round II of Doklam

On Doklam the Chinese are there to stay and say infrastructure development is legitimate on its sovereign territory. For them, the ‘Doklam disengagement’ was a necessary pause for BRICS and 19th CPC. The ‘understanding’ (not agreement) for disengagement was flawed and drafted in haste. Briefly, the GOI statement of August 28 said that it was a “mutual decision by Indian and Chinese troops to disengage and withdraw from part of Doklam that is disputed between China and Bhutan…” On the same day, GOI confirmed that after due verification disengagement by both sides that included tents and road construction equipment was almost complete.

The Chinese issued separate but more assertive statements: border face-off resolved in agreement in which both sides came to an understanding for disengagement of border personnel. Chinese news agency Xinhua noted India had agreed to withdraw personnel and equipment that had crossed the border back to the Indian side. Chinese troops verified this at the scene and will continue to exercise their sovereign right to preserve its territorial integrity at Doklam. At present the Chinese are at Doklam in temporary structures but much fewer than the original 1800 soldiers. They have vastly improved their defences, building more than 8 helipads, machine gun pill boxes and improved support infrastructure. Militarily they are in more advantageous position than in June 2017. They have violated agreements with India and Bhutan by attempting to alter the status quo by building a Class 40 road usable by tanks over territory disputed with Bhutan. The intended road leads to a disputed trijunction involving all three countries in contravention of an India-China agreement of 2012 that would give China strategic superiority over Bhutan and India. This is the first time Indian troops confronted PLA on Bhutanese soil.

The disengagement agreement was flawed because it was not a joint statement and it failed to ensure withdrawal from the face-off site on Doklam to positions held before 16 June. In agreements between China and Bhutan of 1988 and 1998, both sides are required to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959. This was contained in a demarche and press release issued by Bhutan on 20 June and 29 June.

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj had emphasised in Parliament that there should be ‘simultaneous withdrawal’ which is different from disengagement. Army Chief Gen Bipin Rawat had confirmed the presence of Chinese troops and infrastructure on Doklam while Indian troops have withdrawn to their post a mere 300 m from Doklam. But PLA remains on Doklam. The second Indian failing is that while China has focussed on historical agreements of 1890 which were overtaken by later agreements, New Delhi fell shy of emphasising its Treaty Agreement with Bhutan of 2007 – of Bhutan’s protectorate status, as the Chinese call it. Article 2 of this treaty emphasises that India and Bhutan will cooperate closely on issues relating to national interest and not allow the use of territory harmful to national security and interest of the other. At a public function in New Delhi then defence minister Arun Jaitley referred to the defence arrangement with Bhutan and any adversity to it would harm our security interests. The occupation by China of Doklam and its road construction through it will impinge negatively on the national security interests of both countries. The Chinese will turn Doklam in Chumbi valley into a strategic hub and keep creeping into West Bhutan as they have been doing since the 1960s.

Beijing is testing the strength, endurance and longevity of the India-Bhutan treaty relationship. It is determined to draw a wedge and wean away Thimpu from New Delhi. Most of all, it wants all Indian troops deployed since 1963 in Bhutan out and establish full diplomatic relations with it. The visibility of the Indian military in Bhutan is an embarrassment for the new-found democracy in Bhutan and things have to be done to lower its profile. This time around, China failed to prevail in bullying Bhutan and bulldozing the road across Doklam. This winter will pass but soon through creep and stealth, PLA will occupy Doklam in strength unless India underlines its defence understanding with Bhutan more emphatically and Thimpu endorses the arrangement. That there is an intrinsic linkage between settlements of their respective border disputes with China has been amplified by Doklam and Article 2 of the 2007 Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship. A premature border agreement between China and Bhutan would unhinge India’s only strategic leverage in the Chumbi valley of Tibet and instead confer an immense operational advantage to PLA.

In Bhutan, India has focussed on regime stability of the Wangchuck dynasty and now, graduated constitutional monarchy. In 1991 it played a cardinal role in ensuring that migrant Nepalese called Bhupalese did not outnumber the local Drukpas like the case in Sikkim.  According to the 1983 census the Bhupalese were 53 percent and the Royal Bhutan Army had 40 percent Nepalese.

K4 (King IV) Jigme Singey Wangchuck had admitted that he had put all his eggs in India’s basket and Bhutan was tied to India’s security system. India and Bhutan should have been more transparent about their defence cooperation and New Delhi persuaded Thimpu to demand status quo ante of 16 June 2017 again through diplomatic channels and even as some have suggested approaching the UN. Without diplomatic relations, Bhutan has engaged in 24 rounds of border talks with China starting 1984 and China has offered a swap deal to Bhutan since 1999 – exchanging 749 sq km of land in north Bhutan for 269 sq km in the west including Doklam. Why would China make this offer if Doklam belongs to it in perpetuity?

More than reason, China comprehends comprehensive strength. India has to demonstrate its political will to stand by Bhutan as it has done but equally, Bhutan has to resist any de-coupling by China of its relations with India. Beijing has already gained a significant political advantage over India’s Himalayan bastion in Nepal. For their Gross National Happiness, most Bhutanese would certainly want to remain with India. For China though the road to Thimpu is via Doklam.

The author is founder member of Defence Planning Staff, currently the Integrated Defence Staff