Belt and Road Forum: India's cold shoulder to China’s global splash

China’s first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) concluded with Beijing claiming it had laid the foundation for hitherto unimagined global connectivity and cooperation. In a personal triumph for Chinese President Xi Jinping, a large number of countries participated and as many as 29 heads of government were present — India was conspicuous by its absence. This macro-connectivity Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also referred to as the OBOR (One Belt, One Road) has a road and rail component — the belt; and a maritime strand — the road — that when realised in totality will link Asia, Europe and parts of Africa — with China predictably, as the hub — from where the spokes will radiate outwards.

The BRI has the personal stamp of the Xi Jinping aspiration — to tell the world the story of China. The summary is how the benign Middle Kingdom will march towards its preordained position in the global political firmament and take all other nations along with it towards higher levels of shared prosperity and peaceful co-existence. China’s remarkable economic progress that began with Deng’s four modernisations in the mid-1980s with a marked domestic focus will be consolidated three decades later by the Xi vision of reaching out confidently to the world. The packaging is that the BRI is a win-win project and there are many victories to be consolidated by President Xi — beginning with the Communist Party Congress later in the year where his pre-eminent position will be formalised. China is no longer keeping its ‘head down’ — but reaching out in an expansive and altruistic manner with deep pockets of enticing aid.

However, there is a huge mismatch between the self-image that Beijing seeks to project and the reality on the ground. Many nations have privately expressed their anxiety about becoming ‘subaltern’ spokes. However, they have signed on to the BRI to receive large amounts of Chinese aid — President Xi referred to committing $124 billion — but are wary of the strings that will be attached. Pakistan is a visible OBOR beneficiary with major connectivity projects including one through the disputed Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) that Delhi has objected to.

Delhi evidently was not consulted about this major Xi initiative, and neither was a consensual approach adopted. The grapevine has it that the Beijing communication in 2013 seeking India’s participation in the OBOR was more peremptory in nature, and the POK sovereignty issue was glossed over. PM Modi has gone through his personal learning curve in engaging with China and chose to stay out of this forum in what is seen as a rebuff to President Xi. While the political compulsions from the Indian perspective are compelling — the Beijing BRF summit has several implications for India that merit preliminary scrutiny.

The Modi government has clearly chosen to go public with its reservations about the BRF and in keeping with the earlier practice of detailed transparency (recall the statement issued during the NSG deliberations in June 2016), the MEA highlighted its concerns. These included the Indian sensitivity apropos POK and “sovereignty and territorial integrity” and unease that the BRI lacked transparency and that more than the trade and connectivity potential, Beijing was seeking to constrain India through a regional network that has embedded strategic and security strands. Thus the bi-lateral is likely to become even more brittle and tense than it currently is after the NSG discord, the Beijing veto cast at the UNSC over the terrorism reference, and the more recent fracas over the Dalai Lama.

In yet another observation that may be deemed a departure — the MEA statement refers to the normative benchmarks of global governance and donor credibility and places the onus on Beijing to prove its intent and integrity. “We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance,...transparency and equality. Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects that would create an unsustainable debt burden for communities...and transparent assessment of project costs.”

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal have signed on to the BRI with some reservations — and these have been explicitly stated by Delhi. China’s aid packages come with many opaque costs that can be crippling in the long run, and both Myanmar and Sri Lanka have seen their fiscal obligations to Beijing ballooning in an unexpected manner. India can at best caution its neighbours about a closer embrace with China, but must not be seen as thwarting development and connectivity. Sri Lanka is a good example where major projects including Hambantota were mooted with India, but could not be undertaken by Delhi due to lack of proven capacity.

Enhancing its own capacity — both public sector and private entities — in delivering major infrastructure projects is imperative for Delhi if it is to be able to offer a credible alternative to OBOR — albeit on a more modest scale.

In a prudent move, Delhi has left the door open for a meaningful dialogue with Beijing over the OBOR and added: “We are awaiting a positive response from the Chinese side.” The fact that both the US and Japan decided to send high-level representatives to Beijing has its own sub-text. There are no clear-cut binary options in the contradictory contour of the globalised world of the 21st century. Thus, while Delhi stays away from the BRF — it is still seeking to increase its export of mangoes to China!

The author is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi.