China stages a military ‘show’ in Kathmandu

The Chinese are known for their emphasis on ceremony in international relations. Yet, the visit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chief, General Chen Bingde, to Nepal in the last week of March, was no ceremonial affair. It is fraught with implications.

The strategic significance of the first such visit by a PLA chief in 11 years calls for a close reading of the text as well as the subtext against the backdrop of recent history.

Chen’s main engagement during his three-day visit was with the Nepalese army, of which India’s chief of army staff is an honorary chief (just as Nepal’s army chief is an honorary general in India). Traditionally, the Indian army commands great respect in Nepal. India’s chief of army staff (COAS) is “Sarkar” to large sections, especially Gorkhas, who retired from the Indian Army.

One of the worst periods in India-Nepal relations was in 1989, during the last months of Rajiv Gandhi in office. Differences over the trade and transit treaty led to closure of all but two of the transit points on the 1700-km border. Landlocked Nepal’s economy virtually came to a halt.

At the height of the face-off, then COAS Gen VN Sharma made it clear that it was not practicable for the army to function under orders that forced closure of transit points. “How can you stop kerosene to my Gurkhas and do this to their families?” he was reported to have said.

China’s current military diplomacy in Nepal appears to be aimed at this time-tested bond between the forces, and people, of the two countries. One of the factors behind the 1989 crisis was Kathmandu’s overtures to Beijing for arms shipments. New Delhi saw this as King Birendra “ganging up” with China.

Since then, anti-Indian rhetoric has been a constant in Nepalese politics, particularly after emergence of multiparty democracy in 1990-91. Even so, mainstream leaders were wary of openly courting China, thumbing a nose at India and cracking down on Tibetan refugees to appease Beijing.

Now, all three are happening and with disturbing frequency. Army-to-army relations between China and Nepal being taken to a new level, against the spirit of India-Nepal ties, signals strategic manoeuvring in the neighbourhood, and at a time when India-China defence exchanges remain frozen since last year.

During his visit, Gen Chen offered nearly $20 million worth of military assistance and funds for an army hospital. His visit, Gen Chen emphasised, was for “enhancing China-Nepal comprehensive partnership of cooperation featuring everlasting friendship to move ahead constantly”. Clearly, China is raising its military profile in “India’s backyard”, and Nepal is being motivated and incentivised to do so with a lot of goodies, including proposals for an airport and another China-Nepal road.

Gen Chen went beyond military matters and raised foreign policy issues when he conveyed China’s disapproval of the US, European Union and India “interfering” in Nepal’s internal affairs and “instigating Tibetans”.

China’s castigation of the US and EU for supporting Tibetans is routine. But, denouncing India along with the US and EU is, perhaps, a first. More significant is this being done by the PLA chief – and not by the party leadership or the foreign ministry at home – and, that too, in another country with close ties to India.
This may reinforce the view of the PLA as the power driving China’s new and growing assertiveness in foreign affairs, including in matters such as the refusal of a visa to an Indian general last year.

Of late, Kathmandu has been coming down heavily against Tibetans in Nepal and Tibetan refugees en route to India from China. After Gen Chen’s exhortations, the Nepalese government may become even more repressive in dealing with Tibetans. There’s nothing ideological about China’s engagement with Nepal. Whether the power centre is the monarchy or Maoists, Beijing appears determined to hold Nepal in the grip of “everlasting friendship”.

New Delhi, for all the monetary, material and human resources it invests in Nepal, does not take a direct hand in the Himalayan country’s internal affairs. It only makes known that it is at hand to help with the peace process or constitution-making for sustaining multiparty democracy.  In contrast, China is openly pushing Nepal to complete the peace process and draft the constitution “on its own”. The unsaid part is that Nepal should not allow India any role in these processes.

The question is not whether China is pushing further — and into Nepal — with an anti-Indian agenda. The issue is why New Delhi has not shown the kind of clarity displayed by Beijing in dealing with Nepal.

The author is a political and foreign affairs commentator