The US and Pakistan are fighting different Wars on Terror

The embarrassing discovery that Osama bin Laden lived a stone’s throw away from a Pakistani military academy had led to Pakistan’s complete isolation. After the May 2 incident, Afghan president Hamid Karzai is the first head of state to visit Pakistan. The bin Laden killing nearly ruptured already strained Pak-US diplomatic relations. Since then, many US high level diplomats, military officials and members of Congress have made hurried visits to Islamabad in an effort to reset ties. Incidentally, the day Hamid Karzai reached (June 10) Islamabad, CIA chief Leon Panetta, the next US secretary of defence, also arrived unannounced.

Osama’s killing on Pakistani soil has given America added leverage to push Pakistan into “doing more”. During Hilary Clinton’s visit, where she was accompanied by US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Pakistan was handed an immediate to-do list. This included gathering intelligence on five most wanted Taliban and al Qaeda leaders thought to be hiding in Pakistan. The US has also exerted tremendous pressure on Pakistan’s military to launch an operation in North Waziristan. Taliban’s Haqqani network, the most effective and lethal in Afghanistan’s east, is believed to be operating from North Waziristan. Mike Mullen has publicly accused ISI of “harbouring Haqqani’s terrorist network”.

Under pressure, Pakistan has delivered one of the most wanted terrorists, Ilyas Kashmiri. Pakistan claims that Kashmiri, also wanted by India for his involvement in 26/11, has been killed in a drone attack. However, America is yet to confirm Kashmiri’s death. Pakistan may not hesitate to hunt down more al Qaeda leaders, but ambiguity on the future of the Taliban still remains. Pakistan is highly reluctant to launch an all-out military operation in North Waziristan.

During his visit, CIA chief Leon Panetta has apparently failed to break the ice. Panetta is reported to have left Pakistan “without reaching a deal on resetting the troubled relationship with ISI”. Pakistan is ready to wash its hands of al Qaeda, which does not serve any of Islamabad’s palpable strategic interests. But the Afghan Taliban on the other hand, particularly the Haqqani network, is a trump card for Islamabad. For Pakistan to remain relevant in Afghanistan, Pakistan-sponsored Taliban have to regain influence in Kabul. Liquidation of the Haqqani network will drastically compromise Pakistan’s position in Afghanistan. That’s the reason why Pakistan is frantically trying to protect the Haqqani network, even at the cost of its relationship with America. Pakistan seems to have forced Kabul to accept its position. After failing to rout Taliban, America in order to withdraw from Afghanistan, may also have finally accepted Taliban’s role in Kabul.

Afghan president Hamid Karzai visited Islamabad primarily to attend the first meeting of the joint Pakistan-Afghan peace commission. The Pak-Afghan joint peace commission also includes the military and intelligence chiefs of both the countries, an institutional effort devised to rope in Taliban. Karzai expects Pakistan to influence Taliban to enter a dialogue with Kabul.

The quantum of influence that Pakistan wields on a fiercely independent Taliban, who considers Karzai an American puppet, can be easily contested. If the Taliban have to negotiate, they will like to talk directly to Washington rather than Karzai. This makes sense especially when the Taliban have successfully survived the American onslaught. Speculations are rife that America has already established contact with the Taliban. The fact that every war ends at a dialogue table should hardly come as a surprise. America has decided to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Instead of an anti-insurgency war, it will like to confine itself to only counter terrorism in the future. America in the long run may perceive only al Qaeda as the real threat and not the Taliban. For that it only needs to station a small number of special forces in Afghanistan to mainly blunt al Qaeda’s capabilities to carry out attacks on American soil. What happens to the region may not be the real concern of a declining superpower. The limits of America’s nation-building capabilities were earlier exposed in Iraq, now Afghanistan has fully nullified the myth of America’s military supremacy.

The question is not that America has failed to subdue the Taliban or for that matter Taliban have forced a stalemate. The fact that hardline Muslim groups may consider America’s failure to be Taliban’s success is a concern but not the real one. America’s hasty withdrawal will leave the region highly destabilised. Even if America decides to stay-put for a longer time, it will not guarantee peace. America has no options left. That is the critical factor.

Do we still doubt that war in Kabul was a misadventure? There is a simple lesson here for India and Pakistan — military jingoism only leads to destruction and not peace.