The Dalai Lama is upping his game against the Chinese

Two important events occurred in Dharamsala over the past few days, namely, the Dalai Lama’s decision to relinquish political authority over the ‘government-in-exile’ and, the election of a new ‘Kalon Tripa’, or ‘Prime Minister’. These radiated a multiplicity of messages to an interested audience.

The Dalai Lama’s refusal to recant his proposal initially made on March 10, that the forthcoming session of the Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies — or the parliament of Tibetans in exile — should allow him to step down as political leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile, should be interpreted by Beijing as a warning shot across the bow. It appears especially to be a signal to Beijing to prepare for protracted and tough negotiations with the Tibetan people in the latter’s struggle for independence.

Beijing will now have to choose between continuing with its policy of treating the ongoing negotiations between its representatives and the Dalai Lama’s envoys, which have dragged on inconclusively for over a decade, as cosmetic window dressing or opting for a new strategy.

These negotiations are likely to henceforth be monitored by a popularly elected body of the Tibetan community in exile, thereby diminishing for Beijing any advantage that it might have had till now of addressing itself to a single, centralised authority. Importantly, the restraint on the scope of the process exercised by the Dalai Lama will also be reduced.

The Dalai Lama’s traditional message, issued each March 10 to mark the anniversary of the Lhasa Uprising of 1959, is an important occasion used by him to communicate his thinking to the almost six million Tibetans inside China and the other Tibetans in exile. The anniversary message is particularly studied by this audience.

The Dalai Lama’s decision to relinquish political leadership this year, which was a part of his March 10 message, could well suggest to Tibetans inside Tibet to think in terms of demanding a similar devolution of political power and greater autonomy for themselves.

The response from the Chinese communist regime, which has accorded high priority to maintaining stability in Tibet, was anticipatedly swift and sharp. The official Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece, People’s Daily, on March 22, front-paged an article claiming that Lobsang Sangay, the leading candidate for the post of ‘Kalon Tripa’, or ‘Prime Minister’ of the Tibetan ‘government-in-exile’, had spent many years in the West and had risen to the highest echelons of the ‘Tibetan Youth Congress’ (TYC), a “terrorist organisation in nature”.

It described the TYC as an organisation that looks “a kin member of al Qaeda, Chechnyan armed terrorists and ‘East Turkestan’ separatists”. The article claimed that TYC elements had penetrated the inner core of the “Dalai Lama’s clique” and were poised to undertake “terrorist” activities.

Security was, as usual, considerably enhanced during this period and Tibet was placed off limits to foreigners, including journalists. Nevertheless, sporadic incidents of rioting often involving monks continued to occur. On March 16, a 20-year old Tibetan monk from Kirti Monastery in Sichuan province immolated himself, following which hundreds of monks and laypersons protested.

Separately, during the Eleventh National People’s Congress, or China’s version of a parliament, that opened in Beijing on March 5, officials of the Tibet Autonomous Region sought to underline that they have a firm grip on the situation. They claimed that even “the eventual death of the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, will have no major impact on the stability of the Chinese-ruled region”.

The head of the region’s parliamentary delegation clarified “there will be little repercussions (when the Dalai Lama dies) due to religious factors, but we will take that into consideration and will surely guarantee long-term political stability in Tibet”. A member of the all-important Politburo Standing Committee had asserted in Beijing on February 24, that “the fight against the Dalai Lama clique must be continued…”. This message was reinforced by Chinese president Hu Jintao at the National People’s Congress.

Indications are clearly that the current top Party leadership as well as the emerging leaders are firmly wedded to the preservation and continuance of the Communist Party’s pre-eminent position and that central policies towards China’s minority nationalities are unlikely to be diluted. The internal public security apparatus, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, will be reinforced.