China's rising 'red tide' portends a shift of ideology to the past

Nostalgia is the selective recall of pleasant memories of days gone by. Economic hardships imposed on the ordinary Chinese by the reform process have contributed to a wave of nostalgia for Mao’s era. The generation of Chinese born between the 1950s and 1970s similarly generally retain favourable memories of the tumultuous Cultural Revolution decade (1965-75). The majority were ‘Red Guards’ and many suffered no physical harm. Most, including those who saw their parents penalised, later joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) primarily to advance careers or ensure security in the years ahead. These individuals are now entering China’s party, government and military power elite. The influence of ‘pro-Mao’ sentiments was visible during the recent National People’s Congress (NPC) session — China’s version of a parliament.

Indicating the mood within the leadership, China’s premier devoted an entire paragraph of his report to the NPC to strengthening of civic morality, reinforcing the peoples’ belief in socialism with Chinese characteristics and building traditional Chinese virtues. Echoing a decades-old theme, he spoke of building the ‘socialist spiritual countryside’. He added that culture needs to properly ‘guide’ society, and that the print and electronic media, propaganda machinery and internet can together achieve this.

Over the past few years pro-Mao sentiments and activities of the ‘Left’, or neo-Maoist, forces has been increasing. These forces are particularly critical of the rising incidence of corruption, widening gap between the rich and poor, growing instances of land grabbing, and collapse of faith in communist ideology.

Bo Xilai, a ‘princeling’ tipped for elevation in 2012 to the politburo standing committee, has seemingly tapped into these sentiments and launched a ‘Red revival’ campaign in Chongqing.

In January 2010, Chongqing approved inclusion of a Red Guard cemetery in the list of protected historical monuments. Other ‘Red’ activities include singing Mao-era ‘Red songs’ and texting Mao quotations. Some politburo standing committee members, including Xi Jinping, widely viewed as president Hu Jintao’s successor, have praised Bo Xilai’s ‘Red revival’ efforts.

China’s vice-president and Military Commission vice-chairman Xi Jinping himself visited Mao’s former home in Shaoshan, Hunan, twice in the past six months. During his visit this March, he praised the ‘spiritual legacy’ of Mao Zedong, as had Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2003 on the occasion of Mao’s 110th birth anniversary.

Politburo standing committee member Li Changchun, interacting recently with NPC delegates from Guizhou province, spoke of building “a system of public cultural services and development of Red Tourism”. Official Chinese statistics reveal that revenues from tourists has been rising each year because of “Red tourism” in Zunyi, venue of the ‘historic’ Zunyi Conference convened by Mao.

The ‘Left’ has recently also begun engaging in public debates with more liberal elements within China’s power elite. Qin Xiao, Chairman of the ‘Baoyuan Foundation’ and a ‘Princeling’, was pilloried for advocating a departure from the ‘statist’ fiscal policy that China has been following and for speaking of ‘universal values’. Utopia, a ‘Left’ website, included his picture among those of nine dissidents all with a noose around their necks. Attacks against proponents of greater political freedom and restraints on state sector enterprises increased as the NPC and CPPCC plenums drew near.

The entry of Chinese leaders, born between the mid-1950s and 80s, into the echelons of power will have far reaching consequences. This well-educated leadership group firmly believes that the CCP’s primacy is essential for China’s stability and progress. They are largely doctrinaire, will brook no relaxation of political controls, and will rigorously implement political and ideological education. Beijing’s stringent policies towards Tibetans and Uyghurs has their approval. This rising generation of leaders will probably accelerate domestic developmental programmes like diversion of the Brahmaputra and are unlikely to yield concessions on territorial issues.

The author is a former additional secretary in the cabinet secretariat, Government of India.