Tiger, tiger burning out

As the bitter ethnic war in Sri Lanka inches towards a bloody climax, the questions that arise are the following: What did the war achieve for either side? What were the concessions the Sinhalese could have made to avoid so much bloodshed? What could the Tamils have accepted short of independence?

The answer is obvious: greater political and economic autonomy within the framework of a single country. The obvious did not, however, seem so obvious to the combatants due to a misreading of each other’s strengths. Both sides underestimated the resolve of the other. The Lankans didn’t see the fervour behind the Tamil complaints of discrimination; the Tamils didn’t see the Lankan determination to fight to the bitter end to avoid vivisecting their country. If both sides had realised how much they were willing to fight for their beliefs, they may have been more amenable to compromise.

For India, which faces several insurgencies and revolts, the first lesson to learn is this: it must display determination and muscle early in any war. Otherwise, the adversary is likely to conclude we are weak. This is what happened with Pakistan which foisted four wars on us; this is what happened with the Khalistanis in Punjab; and this is what is happening in Kashmir and the Maoist insurgencies across eastern and central India.
India’s approach has always been lackadaisical. First, we start by pretending the problem doesn’t exist; next, when we can’t ignore it, our liberals step in and say a little development will solve the problem; it is only when the problem gets completely out of hand that we invest the resources needed to squash the terrorists/militants. State power is used only when it is the only option left.

The right sequence should be to squash an insurgency at the first sign of its approaching; next, we should roll out the development and political package to display magnanimity; finally, we should maintain armed vigil till the menace is finally gone. Giving the sops first only emboldens the insurgents; not giving it at all after victory will help grievances to fester and grow.

The second lesson is to spot and isolate the ideological and spiritual mentors of the insurgents. Behind every militancy there is usually a religious or social ideology. Mix the two, and the power of the cause doubles. The Kashmiri militants are driven by the idea of a Muslim state with Kashmiri features. The Khalistanis developed similar ideas around theocracy and a Sikh homeland. The Nagas had the church egging them on in their war with India.

In Sri Lanka, there is no doubt in anyone’s mind that the various churches in south India and abroad provided succour to the LTTE. A recent article in the Sri Lanka Guardian affirms that “the Catholic Church played a major role in the genesis of the Tiger movement under the cover of Tamil liberation ....” A 2007 article in The Asian Tribune by Palitha Senanayake alleges that “the church had been consistently ‘sympathetic’ to the needs of the Tamils and helped them in many ways to build up a diaspora from the 1960s.” After the 1983 ethnic clashes, western churches helped rehabilitate the diasapora, raising the latter’s funding capabilities.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the top LTTE leaders including supremo V Prabhakaran and his close aide till 2006 (Anton Balasingham, who died that year), are Christian by religion or have church support. J Gaspar Raj, a Catholic priest who shot to fame for his passionate espousal of the Tamil cause on Radio Veritas, a Catholic radio service, was seen recently on news TV screaming at Subramaniam Swamy for attacking the LTTE. Raj has shared platforms with LTTE fund-raisers abroad.
The third lesson is about cutting off the source of funding as soon as possible. This means you need a forensic investigative capability, and expert policing. In LTTE’s case, most countries — barring India and the US — had not even proscribed the organisation till the start of this decade. The EU and Canada did so as late as 2006, almost two decades after the world knew of their murderous intentions. The South Asian Terrorism Portal, quoting Jane’s Intelligence Report, says the LTTE’s annual income is “between $200-300 million, making it the second biggest income generating terrorist organisation in the world.” The Tigers apparently had enough money to run a banana republic.

If the Tigers are being humbled now in their dens, it’s only because the funds tap is being closed tight and the Sri Lankans have managed to achieve complete superiority in firepower. This is not the same as saying that the Tigers are history; small groups can recover and continue the insurgency. But their ability to hold territory and run a state is over. That’s the best thing to happen to the subcontinent in a long, long time.