The entire operation against the terrorists who struck on Wednesday was marked by serious lapses, including one-upmanship between various security agencies
There was one-upmanship, lack of coordination, gaps in tactics
NEW DELHI: The entire operation against the terrorists who struck on Wednesday was marked by serious lapses, including one-upmanship between various security agencies, lack of proper coordination and crucial gaps in tactics deployed.
The one-upmanship reached a level that the government had to order the army to ask its southern command chief, Lt-Gen Noble Thamburaj, to go back to Pune. Thamburaj had flown down to Mumbai to brief the media even as the operation was on.
The government also instructed the three services to keep their mouths shut and not try and grab media attention when the operation was on. The army, navy and air force were reminded that it was an NSG operation and that their role was only peripheral.
On the other hand, the NSG movement was marred by delays and uncertainties, letting terrorists run amok and kill innocents.
Looking back, several serving commandos and senior military commanders who have directed commando raids in Kashmir and elsewhere, are surprised at gaping holes in the operations. “The first step in an operation like this is to identify the enemy, ‘make contact’ with him, then pin him down so that he is unable to move around causing further damage,” says a senior army officer.
But, unfortunately, the NSG seemed to have gone in without proper assessment of the terrorists, and their locations. Not surprisingly, the NSG chief made claims of clearing up the Taj, only to withdraw it later.
In fact, the Mumbai police and marine commandos should have pinned down the terrorists at the very beginning. “That did not happen, you let them go around butchering people,” says another military officer. A former NSG officer said there has almost been “no improvement from the days before the IC 814 hijack.”
In 1999, after an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked, several crucial hours were wasted, waiting for the crisis management group to clear the deployment of anti-hijack commandos. By the time the commandos were ready to leave Delhi, the hijacked plane had left the Indian airspace.
Something similar happened on Wednesday. By the time, NSG got clearance and their commandos were ready to take off from Delhi on an air force plane, several hours had been lost. After they landed in Mumbai, instead of airlifting to the scene, they rode a bus to the site.
And while the operations were underway, various security agencies were making their bid to get media attention. The navy went to the extent of organising a press conference of marine commandos (Marcos) who took part in initial operations. The Marcos commander faced the media with his face covered, but gave out several clues vital to the investigations, even as the NSG was battling the terrorists.
On the other hand, the NSG commandos who took over from the Marcos did not have much good to say about them and the local police. “No proper assessment of the situation had been made before we landed. The ATS and Marcos were just manning the hotels,” says an NSG commando.
“They had no clue of location of terrorists, their numbers, the make of the weapons etc,” one of them added. The police and Marcos also had no idea of the number of people caught inside the hotels, and the hotel layout.
j_josy@dnaindia.netk_yogesh@dnaindia.net 
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