Mixed signals

Brahma Chellaney

The periodic summit meetings between India and China are deceptively all sweetness and light. During prime minister Manmohan Singh’s recent visit, there was no forward meeting on any contentious issue, but the accent was on the positive.

That should surprise no one. Although the underlying wariness and suspicions remain, the two giants, for different reasons, feel the need to publicly play down the competitive dynamics of their relationship and emphasise cooperation.

Yet, the conciliatory words that come out from the bilateral summitry are a poor substitute for the glaring lack of progress on the issues that divide India and China, like the territorial disputes.

If anything, the rhetoric at times is a painful reminder of the empty slogans of the 1950s that helped blind India to China’s furtive territorial encroachments and subsequent surprise invasion in 1962, which Jawaharlal Nehru characterised as Beijing’s return of ‘evil for good’.

The wounds of that 32-day war have been kept open by Beijing’s assertive claims to Indian areas, even as it holds on to the territorial gains of that conflict.

China’s unwillingness to settle the border dispute on the basis of the status quo has drawn further strength from then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s 2003 recognition of Tibet as “part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China”. Emboldened by that recognition, which stripped India of diplomatic leverage, Beijing has become publicly

assertive on its claim to Arunachal Pradesh, a state more than twice the size of Taiwan. Now it insists that India cede at least the Tawang valley — a critical corridor between Lhasa and Assam of immense military import because it overlooks the chicken-neck that connects India with its northeast.

In that light, Singh has done well to visit Arunachal, becoming the first PM in two decades to tour that isolated but strategically located state.

But he would have strengthened his hands had he visited Arunachal, ‘the land of the rising sun’, before going to Beijing, rather than upon his return. Also, instead of having omitted Tawang from his tour of Arunachal, the PM ought to have made a stop there to send out a needed signal to Beijing.

Employing the doctrine of incremental territorial annexation, Beijing has laid claim to Tawang on the basis of that area’s putative historical ties to Tibet. By 1951, China had fully occupied the

Tibetan plateau, yet no Chinese set foot in Tawang until the invading Chinese army in 1962 poured through the Namkha Valley, close to the tri-junction of Tibet, India and Bhutan. In pouring forces into Tawang, China scoffed at India’s contention that, in conformity with the McMahon Line, the border in that region ran along the high Thagla Ridge. Still,

after halting its aggression, Beijing withdrew from Tawang, as it did from the rest of Arunachal (then NEFA), while keeping its territorial gains in Ladakh. That was in line with the punitive aim of its aggression, which Premier Zhou Enlai had admitted was “to teach India a lesson”.

Significantly, Singh is the first Indian PM to return from Beijing without making any unwarranted reference to Tibet to please his hosts.

The ‘T’ word is conspicuously missing from the joint communiqué — a key point the media failed to catch. Contrast that with the last joint communiqué issued when President Hu Jintao visited New Delhi: “The Indian side reiterates that it has recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China, and that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position.”

The only way India can build counter-leverage against Beijing is to gently shine a spotlight on the Tibet issue and China’s failure to grant promised autonomy to the Tibetans. This can be done by India in a way that is neither provocative nor confrontational. New Delhi ought to make the point that China’s security will be enhanced if it reached out to Tibetans and concluded a deal that helped bring back the Dalai Lama from his long exile in India.

A first step for India to help reclaim leverage and stop being overtly defensive is to cease gratuitously referring to Tibet as part of China. In doing just that, Singh has shown good judgment.

He even sent the foreign secretary to Dharamsala last Sunday to brief the Dalai Lama on his Beijing discussions. That the Dalai Lama remains an invaluable asset for India can be seen from his public repudiation of China’s claim that Arunachal, including Tawang, were traditionally part of Tibet.

The writer is a strategic affairs expert.