Pause or end?

India could lose international respect and clout if the Indo-US deal finally collapses

On October 12, our mild-mannered, soft-spoken and cerebral Prime Minister started yet one more storm not only in the media, but also in the strategic community at large.

For weeks, the spokesmen of the Left parties had been making ominous and threatening noises about an alleged ‘drift’ in India’s foreign policy towards the US, and vowing to sink the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, even if it meant creating instability in the country and pulling down the government with the inevitable consequence of national elections.

In this backdrop, the PM, speaking at a public function, seemed to suggest that the agreement that he and his team had worked for so hard might be put on hold, might even be allowed to wither away by delay. If there was glee in the halls of the opponents of the agreement, there was consternation and dismay among its supporters.

It is clear that now the debate is no longer about the arcana of the agreement itself. Most of the issues that had been identified by the Left parties as problematic have been satisfactorily dealt with in the 123 Agreement; in fact, the international perception — and not only in the US — is that India has obtained a ‘sweetheart’ deal, one that gives the country access to international advanced technology and the nuclear energy market, without her having had to compromise on any of her fiercely held convictions.

The disbelief and bewilderment at the present situation within India’s polity is natural.
At the UPA-Left meeting on Monday, there was no change in the positions of the different parties, except that the UPA appeared to still want to proceed with the next stages of the process.

The whole issue has been deferred to November 16; whether there will be any change in the party positions by that date remains to be seen. Many have already written off the ‘deal’ at least for the remaining months of this government’s term.

The impact of this episode, whichever way it finally unravels, is bound to be felt in India’s international relations. India’s credibility as a negotiator and ability to take a domestically tough decision will necessarily be reflected on the way in which other countries will assess this country’s international commitments.

There will certainly be life after the agreement should it fail, but India will have lost her voice. It will be perceived that while India may have the ambition, she does not have the will or capability to implement her agreements, given her fractured polity.

Her determination to deliver on her commitments will be in doubt as will her seriousness as a negotiating partner.

The consequences on bilateral relations are difficult to predict: there is bound to be a negative reaction in the US: if, as is being projected, the next US President is a Democrat with a Democratic Congress, India can expect the lecturing and hectoring to begin again — pressures to sign the CTBT, the FMCT, the NPT and so on. We will be back to Square One with a vengeance.

While this might please the Left parties in India, they might not stay so smug, as economic and commercial ties are bound to grow, as will people to people contact. With other major countries, there is bound to be a loss of respect, particularly with nations which would have commercially benefited from the opening up of the world
market for nuclear energy, like Russia and France.

China’s attitude will be perhaps the most interesting, as we are bound to see in the forthcoming China-India-Russia meeting. The time frame within which China will have to start worrying about India’s role as a rival will have receded.

Would India be seen by the non-aligned countries as a leader, as seems to be desperately hoped for by the Left parties?

Notwithstanding these negatives — even should the agreement be delayed considerably — some steps that have already been taken cannot be undone: a broad basis for cooperation with the US is in place and the 123 Agreement has been initialed.

India is a member of ITER — though whether she can continue to be one without full participation in the nuclear energy regime is a moot point — the US law granting India a waiver has been passed, and several NSG countries are interested in continued efforts to promote civilian nuclear cooperation with India.

But advanced technology will continue to be denied globally and a window of opportunity for India may have closed for the foreseeable future.

The writer is former Indian ambassador to the United Nations