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Conscription is not the only way for the armed forces to increase its numbers

The Army Chief’s suggestion that India might need conscription to address the shortage of army officers has certainly made the impact that it was intended to. Many in civvy street, especially the younger generation, were worried that conscription might soon follow, until the government put such fears to rest. But the Army does have a problem at hand —for a force that is expected to have over 45,000 officers, it faces a shortage of over 11,000 young officers or over 25 per cent. And the situation is likely to get worse if the sharp decline in applications to its two premier officers training institutions is an indication of things to come.

While the NDA at Khadakvasla (which takes in cadets for all the three services) has been unable to fulfil even two-thirds of its vacancies this year, the IMA in Dehradun has received only about one-third of its total requirement of 250 cadets for this term. The picture is a grim one. But statistics can be misleading. The question of whether the solution lies in compulsory military service has to be discussed thoroughly as there are several dimensions to be taken into account. 

The armed forces in India have gradually lost popularity as the career choice of Indian youth for a variety of reasons. First, they do not offer the salaries and perks that the corporate sector does. Second, the slow promotional opportunities in the army, compared to a more rapid rise in the corporate sector, are also a deterrent. But then, even the civil services offer promotions based on seniority, not brilliance.

The problem is of a shortage of junior officers — Majors and below — and not seniors. Third, the tough working conditions and disrupted family lives are a strong deterrent to young men (and now even women). But even fat salaries and generous perks on par with multinational companies are still not likely to attract those who don’t have the nerve to take on what soldiering requires.
 
So where lies the answer to the Army’s woes? Obviously, Army officers deserve much better salaries and perks, particularly those in the line of fire in Kashmir and the Northeast. But complaints rarely come from officers assigned to a UN mission, despite the risks and separations because, professional exposure apart, these carry various benefits. In addition, the government needs to reexamine the size of India’s army.
 
At over 11 lakh today, it is perhaps the largest volunteer force in the world. But in an age of high-tech gadgets, a better rationale needs to be worked out to quickly reduce the size of the army and its officer requirements, and to replace some of the manpower-intensive jobs with technology, like radars to man certain borders. Also, the government must improve the calibre of the nation’s paramilitary forces —such as the Armed Police Units, Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force — so that they increasingly replace the army in tackling insurgency; currently, over 40 per cent of the Army is deployed in counter-insurgency operations.
 
Finally, the Army must better utilise its resources. For instance, it needs to make good use of its JCOs, (for Junior Commissioned Officers) — the large but relatively under-utilised Subedars — by giving them greater responsibility and making them accountable for it. The current tendency to rely on a young officer with two years of service instead of a JCO with 20 years experience, even for mundane jobs, has added to the need for more young officers in the Army. Add to that the force’s obsession with training: following the Chinese invasion of 1962, the Indian Army started training courses — at Mhow, Bangalore, Jabalpur, Pune and elsewhere — mandating that a large number of officers attend.

The establishments staffed by Generals and a large number of instructors have only increased. And units are constantly required to send officers to attend these courses, even at the cost of operational efficiency, adding to the shortage of young officers. Many of these courses are of little use; for example, an officer trained in the maintenance of vehicles could be sent to man an isolated post in the Himalayas, where the only mode of transport is a mule, not a vehicle!

In short, the crisis in the Army is really not as bad as it is made out to be. It is somewhat like saying, ‘I need four cars, but I have only three. I cannot manage without the fourth.’

The author is a former Indian Army officer