Down the valley again

 

 

Ever since Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) acceded to India on October 26, 1947, Pakistan has tried every conceivable means to gain control of the Kashmir valley. It failed to achieve this objective by infiltration and invasion in 1965. It tried to change the status of J&K, advocating a UN-sponsored plebiscite despite failing to fulfill the pre-condition of withdrawing its forces from the region, which the UN resolutions of 1948 specified. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, however, declared that these resolutions calling for a plebiscite were no longer valid. The Bush administration has demanded that Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir issue in bilateral talks with India. President Jiang Zemin of China told his Pakistani hosts in 1996 that China believes that complex issues defying solution should not come in the way of developing good neighbourly relations. Finally, the EU parliament meeting in Brussels appears set to pass a resolution rejecting Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite, criticising that country for curbing democratic freedom in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and calling for an end to Pakistani support for terrorism in J&K.

 

It is under these circumstances that General Musharraf reiterated his proposal for settling the Kashmir issue in a recent interview to an Indian television channel. Over the past two years, Musharraf has said that he is prepared to move away from earlier Pakistani insistence on a plebiscite if India also moved way from its insistence on making the Line of Control (LOC) an international border. Responding to Musharraf’s proposal, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced in Amritsar on March 22, 2006, that while borders cannot be redrawn, they could be made irrelevant, “just lines on a map”. He also proposed that people on both sides of the LOC in J&K should be able to move freely and trade with each other. He suggested that consultative mechanisms could be set up in order to promote cooperation across the LOC.

 

Musharraf initially suggested that J&K should be divided into seven separate regions (five on the Indian side and two on the Pakistan side of the LOC). He added that the framework for resolving Kashmir should involve ‘demilitarisation’ in specified regions — Baramulla, Kupwara and Srinagar in particular. He advocated ‘self-governance’ in J&K without indicating whether it would be equally applicable to areas under Pakistani control — specifically POK and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. Finally, Musharraf proposed ‘joint management’ of J&K by India and Pakistan. India rejected any such possibility of dividing Kashmir on sectarian or ethnic lines. There does, however, appear to have been substantive discussion between the two countries on various other proposals made by Musharraf.

 

There is, for the first time, some political space for India and Pakistan to agree on a framework to resolve the Kashmir issue. There should be no problem in promoting trade and economic exchanges across the LOC, as Singh suggests, if Pakistan fulfils its commitments under the South Asian Free Trade Agreement. There should also be no problem in promoting free movement of people across the LOC, once Indian concerns about infiltration are addressed by Pakistan. However, Musharraf has not explained what he means by ‘self-governance’. Both POK and the Northern Areas presently enjoy virtually no autonomy. India appears to be ready to discuss issues of ‘self-governance’ in J&K with Pakistan, provided there is an equal measure of self-governance on both sides of the LOC. While ‘joint management’ may not be accepted, the two countries could consider mechanisms for cooperation in areas like trade, tourism, education and environment in J&K.

 

No government in Delhi can agree to demilitarisation of J&K, as this would create a power vacuum, which could lead to take-over of the state by armed separatist elements backed by Pakistan. New Delhi could, however, agree to consider redeployment and reduction of its forces in the region, once Pakistan irrevocably dismantles its infrastructure of terrorism. We are thus in the very initial stages of a dialogue process with Pakistan on J&K. This process could be wrecked by continuing terrorist violence sponsored by Pakistan. Finally, would our problems with Pakistan end even if the Kashmir issue is addressed? On April 11, 1999, General Musharraf proclaimed in Karachi: “India is a hegemonic power and low intensity conflict with India will continue even if the Kashmir dispute is resolved.”