What next for Baluchistan?

Rajesh M Basrur

The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti by Pakistani forces has let loose a fresh wave of violent protest in a country already wracked by sectarian strife, a pervasive jihadi culture and public anger in the non-Punjabi provinces. As mainstream opposition groups step up the pressure on Musharraf, questions are being raised about the potential fallout.

Will this lead to the further unravelling of a failing state? If it does, India has cause to worry. Whatever its reservations about the Pakistani military, the last thing New Delhi wants is a crumbling neighbour whose nuclear weapons or materials might fall into the hands of terrorists. But that is unlikely to happen.

While much of Pakistan is restive, armed opposition to Islamabad is limited. Despite its long history of resistance to central control, Baluchistan is not in a position to break away. Its population is small (about 5 percent of Pakistan’s total) and thinly distributed among a number of tribal chiefs or sardars prone to in-fighting.

Neighbouring Iran, which has a significant Baluch population, will not tolerate a secessionist movement that will inevitably threaten its own integrity. Left-wing elements in the Baluchistan Liberation Army do not see eye to eye with the sardars. In addition, Baluchistan has a large Pashtun population which will resist any attempt to secede.

Tribal groups in Baluchistan and Waziristan are fighting a defensive war of resistance: they have little capacity to overthrow the regime in Islamabad. An important counter-factual to those who anticipate the possibility of Pakistan falling apart is the steady growth of the Pakistani economy. Besides, the market has its ear to the ground. Only last week, the World Bank listed Pakistan among the top ten desirable destinations for global investment.

Under pressure, the army might decide to retreat and allow the political parties to take the helm. After all, even under a properly elected government, the army will retain its hold on power, as it did in the past. But this too will not happen easily. The army has immense stakes in control of the Pakistani state.

The benefits of power are widely distributed among its serving and retired officers through key appointments in government, the public services, and even universities. The army’s tentacles have also spread through so-called ‘welfare organisations’ which have interests in banking, industry and real estate. Rather than risk losing these in the long term if democracy were to consolidate, the army may find it expedient to sacrifice Musharraf if things get worse.

In the past, Baluchistan was not a problem because it was strategically insignificant. Governments could afford to bide their time and suppress local rebellions as these did not impact rest of the country directly. Today, a stable Baluchistan is key to Pakistan's economic future.

Apart from its reserves of gas, it occupies a strategic position astride two major international gas supply routes in the making: from Iran to Pakistan (and potentially India), and from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. The frequency with which gas supplies have been disrupted by Baluch rebels augurs ill for Pakistan's economic plans.

The port of Gwadar, envisaged as a major alternative to congested Karachi, is expected to provide an alternative route for international trade for Pakistan's north. This, too, will be under threat if Baluchistan remains turbulent. Musharraf's military approach to the problem is hence short-sighed. Like the Mughals and the British, the present elites of Pakistan would do well not to antagonise the Baluch people, but rather to coopt their leaders and put in place a grand bargain that would exchange their acquiescence for a piece of the pie.

An attempt in this direction was initiated by caretaker prime minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain in 2004. Musharraf's failure to implement his recommendations has brought the conflict to a head. 

Pakistani leaders have pointed to India as the "foreign hand" which has encouraged the Baluch rebellion. Some Indian strategists have favoured just such an approach to counter Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir. But India's role is limited by the realities of geopolitics. It is hardly in a position to do much without the compliance of Iran and the United States, neither of which has an interest in destabilising Pakistan.

The Baluch problem is one on which we can do little other than score rhetorical points. But it will do us no harm if Pakistan's military rulers are distracted and compelled to consider the risks of a militarised approach to their political objectives.

(The writer is a commentator on international affairs)