Missing the Chinese puzzle

Petroleum minister Murli Deora was the chosen one for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit last week. Though it is the prime minister’s prerogative to choose the country’s representative, given the context, it was a strange choice.

With the stature and profile of the SCO Summit, an expectation that the prime minister himself would represent the government was only fair. The SCO summit agenda in the main included the question of “energy security”. The SCO, which is five years old, comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Apart from these, four countries have observer status —Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran, all of whom attended this Summit meeting.

To fathom the significance of this development, one has to comprehend the manner in which Russia and China are positioning themselves with regard to energy security and regional power issues. The recent chill in the US-Russia relationship can be traced to the emergence of Russia as an influential player in the international energy sector as an exporter.

This enhanced clout will help it develop closer ties with other major European powers, which in turn will impact the cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and Washington’s hegemony over NATO.

Russia’s economic clout flowing from energy exports is making it less vulnerable to US pressure. Russia’s newfound wealth is growing so much so that it has made an offer to wipe out its remaining Soviet era debt of US $ 29 billion to the Paris Club within this year itself.

Add to this the Russian disquiet on the US’s systematic attempts at expansion of influence in former Soviet Republics as seen in the attempt to include Ukraine and Georgia in the expanded NATO. This fragility in the US-Russian relations is leading to a sharp acceleration in the race for control of Caspian oil reserves.

China’s growing economic strength has already made the American establishment rethink its strategies. The recent attempts of the US to co-opt the Indian establishment in its strategic gameplan to control the Malacca Straits, which is currently the major thoroughfare for Chinese hydrocarbon imports, is a part of that growing American wariness. It is in this background that Russia and China are coming closer on energy and economic co-operation.

The cosying up of the Chinese to the Russians assumed a new height with President Putin’s visit to China in March. No less than 29 cooperation agreements were signed. Russian investment in China currently exceeds US $ 500 million. An agreement for the construction of US $10 billion gas pipeline to China from Siberia was also sealed. Russia is building two nuclear plants in China.

The SCO summit, therefore, assumed great significance and its assertion that “in case of emergency events, jeopardising peace, stability and security in the region, the SCO member states will immediately establish contacts and start consultations on a rapid joint response so as to defend, to the utmost extent, the interests of the organisation and its member states”, is a clear pointer to its future direction.

The importance attached by countries like Pakistan and Iran who want to become full-fledged members of the SCO is obvious. Any perceptive strategy watcher would conclude that the SCO could emerge as a counterweight to the NATO.

Interestingly, one can also recall US’s open animosity to the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project. Coupled to this, the attempts to wean away India to the US-led initiative for the Trans Afghan Gas pipeline (TAP) project and India’s inclination to fall for the bait is indicative of the shape of power play in the region.

We have seen a domestic debate hotting up over the retail pricing of petroleum and diesel. There is consensus that apart from taxation issues, the way to keep fuel prices in check lies with the possibility of accessing cheap crude resources. In fact, through our ONGC investment in Russian Sakhalin field and attempted investments in Russia and other Central Asian gas and oil fields, we were trying to overcome our strategic vulnerability.

The choice of Deora to represent India in Shanghai is a clear signal to the US administration that we are game to their strategic plans for taking on the SCO.

The UPA’s Common Minimum Programme (CMP) that “India will pursue an independent foreign policy” rings hollow. India stands to gain much more by being a much closer partner in the SCO process. By hitching itself to the Bush bandwagon, India displays a tendency to put all its diplomatic eggs in the single US basket. The disconnect with the CMP is too glaringly apparent.     

(The writer is a member of the CPI(M) Central Committee.)