'INS Kirpan turned and fled'

NEW DELHI: Bhushan's claim is corroborated by one of the survivors of INS Khukri. Chanchal Singh Gill, who had just joined the ship and had a miraculous escape because he was on duty at the time of attack, says the ship was not on Action Station mode.

"That caused the death of so many people," he told DNA. "The sailors of Khukri were not even wearing life jackets, which is mandatory during Action Stations."
Indian Navy sources told DNA that Bhushan carried out extensive study of INS Kirpan's details, including its engine room records during and after the attack on Khukri

"He was probably the first one to have access to all those critical details," admitted a high-level naval official.

"It is a fact that Khukri and Kirpan were not aware of the Pakistani submarine, even after the latter had first fired a torpedo at Kirpan," Bhushan says. "If the ships do nothing then they do not become aware of the enemy submarines."  According to Bhushan there was also another "critical blunder" that caused the sinking of Khukri.

"The Western Naval Command headquarters under the then Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Vice Admiral SN Kohli, gave permission to Khukri to mount a modification kit on its sonar. A surprising decision given the fact that India was at war with Pakistan and Khukri was sent on an offensive mission," says Bhushan.

"The modification kit would have imposed serious limitations on the anti-submarine capability of Khukri and therefore would amount to a criminal act."

Bhushan directly blames Vice Admiral Kohli for committing "a very serious blunder". For years after the sinking, there were speculation about the modification kit, but it was never confirmed until 'Transition to Triumph', the official history of Indian Navy published by the Historical Cell, Directorate of Naval Operations, confirmed it.

At 2049 hours on December 9, 1971, INS Khukri was hit. "It was burning, exploding and sinking, when INS Kirpan did the unthinkable," says Bhushan. "Kirpan left the scene of action."

It is a statement that finds corroboration in Pakistani accounts of the attack.  Gill corroborates Bhushan. "Kirpan turned tail and fled, rather deserted from battlefield," he says. Gill and other survivors were to spend several hours in the freezing waters of Indian Ocean through the night before being rescued the next day.

"In accordance with the normal practice Kirpan should have immediately carried out an Emergency attack. A/S (anti-submarine) ships are fitted with versatile projectile launchers, capable of firing clusters of high explosive projectiles, which covered large area. Launchers could fire over wide arc even ahead at high speeds, under rapid alteration of courses," Bhushan says.

"After the emergency attack Kirpan should have located the enemy submarine and carried out relentless deliberate attacks till the submarine was destroyed."

The official history presented in the 'Transition to Triumph' says that after firing a few salvos at the submarine Kirpan's "mortars went non-operational".

Admiral Kohli in his memoirs had claimed that "in the circumstances she (Kirpan) took the wisest course", of moving away and returning with INS Katchall, another naval ship, next morning to rescue the survivors. By the time they returned to the scene only six officers and 61 sailors had survived.

The Western Naval Command's Operation Falcon from December 10-13 1971 to hunt and destroy Pakistani submarine Hangor proved to be a failure. "Though the Western Naval Command kept claiming several successful hits against the Pakistani submarine, the fact is that it reached Karachi safely," says Bhushan.