US president Obama has fast-forwarded the global nuclear non-proliferation agenda by initiating several related events over the last few weeks.
They include the US Nuclear Posture Review, which envisions Obama’s hopes of reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in American strategy; a new arms limitation agreement between the United States and Russia (new START) that would drastically reduce the long-range nuclear missiles in their arsenals; and, finally, the Nuclear Security Summit, which identifies the security and safety of nuclear materials as constituting an imminent threat to nuclear non-proliferation.
The Iranians held their own ‘spoiler’ summit, thereafter, to publicise the double standards of the West on these issues, protest its own innocence, and lay down the new battle lines in this debate.The United States could now move towards ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but this is quite uncertain. All these events are, of course, a prelude to a major event next month — the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
So, what is missing in these gatherings?Briefly, the implications of evolving nuclear technology have yet to be addressed. The Nuclear Security Summit approved the need to “encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuels and minimisation of the use of highly enriched uranium where technically and economically feasible. The work plan urges participating states to collaborate on research to develop new technologies that will not use highly enriched uranium fuel for reactor operations or the production of medical and other isotopes.
In truth, nuclear technology has both positive and negative aspects. What is germane here are the problems that nuclear technology raises for nuclear non-proliferation.
Two identifiables that are of immediate relevance: First, the issue of breeder technology, which has inspired several national atomic energy programmes, including that of India.
A report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials argues that, contrary to what has been assiduously claimed, sodium-cooled fast-breeder reactors cannot become the solution to either the power generation or nuclear waste disposal problems.
Despite $50 billion having been spent on their development, we are nowhere near producing a breeder reactor that is economically competitive.
Besides, these reactors are plagued by high costs, long downtime for repairs and maintenance, unresolved proliferation, and safety and security risks. Whether the pursuit of the chimera of breeder technology is worthwhile needs serious consideration by the world community to, at least, save good money following bad.
Second, official interest has been evinced in small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) to generate electricity. They could serve the needs of isolated communities and function as dedicated power plants for industrial enterprises.
The SMR alternative has been approved by Steven Chu, secretary for energy in the Obama administration. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Chu has argued that SMRs, being less than one-third the size of current atomic power plants, can be manufactured in factories and transported to sites.
They can be cost-effective too. SMRs have little environmental impact, and could replace aging thermal power plants that are recognised environmental hazards.
So, what is the downside? SMRs require highly skilled engineers to be working in remote locations, adding to the present problem of getting qualified personnel in large enough numbers. Moreover, these reactors require cooling by a liquid metal like sodium to enable fast neutron fission, which is an inherently dangerous technology. There is the attendant problem of nuclear wastes for which a permanent repository is required.
The US has been unable to operate its Yucca Mountain storage site in Nevada due to unresolved technical issues compounded by strong local opposition. There are serious safety and security issues involved with guarding SMRS scattered around the country, and in transporting fuel supplies and nuclear wastes to and from them. Consequently, the generic problems for the non-proliferation regime are greatly complicated by SMRs.
The forthcoming NPT Review Conference forebodes increased tensions between its developed and developing signatories. The developed West will argue that nuclear truants North Korea and Iran be chastised. The developing countries will urge the need for the nuclear weapon states to meaningfully reduce their nuclear arsenals to reach the elusive ‘global zero goal’. The imperative of technological advance interrogates both these positions and must enter the debate.
Comments