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ShareThe Maoists in India are nowhere near winning the battle against the Indian state like their counterparts in Nepal, but they pose a more serious security threat than they did a few years ago. The situation is likely to deteriorate if narrow politics continues to stand in the way of dealing with this menace more effectively. Left extremism is not a simple law and order problem; it is more complex than other internal security threats. Few would oppose their demand for social and economic justice for the marginalised and deprived sections of society. It is their ideology of an armed revolution to throw out the present democratic system that poses the most serious challenge to the stability and integrity of the Indian state.
The problem of left-extremism predates India's Independence. Then it was confined only to the Telengana area of the erstwhile Hyderabad state. The eruption in Naxalbari in West Bengal in March 1967 marked a new phase in the movement. The Marxist-led government in later years did well to implement a well-considered plan of land reforms. The more important phase of the left-extremist movement started with the merger of the two most important groups, People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India into CPI (Maoists) in September 2004. Its strategy and tactics underwent major changes after the merger. In the earlier phase, the main targets were feudal landlords and the hated money-lenders. Now, the police became the biggest enemy. The failure of the Naxalbari uprising acted as a dampener on their revolutionary zeal for some years. But since then, they have managed not only to expand their base to other parts of the country but have also reorganised themselves into a new fighting force. They have extorted huge funds and equipped themselves with modern arms and explosives. West Bengal, however, took no effective steps to deal with them and was busy patting itself on the back for eliminating left extremism from the state. Till today, it has not even banned the organisation, on one excuse or the other.
There were enough indications even before the declaration of Lalgarh as the 'liberated' zone that the Maoists were expanding their base in West Bengal. They have been active in Midnapore, Purulia and Bankura districts for a few years, but the government was too complacent to take much notice. It allowed the Maoists to consolidate their hold in this area bordering Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar. After burning its fingers at Nandigram and Singur, it became even less willing to take on the Maoists. The government did not wake up to the danger even when they could see an alarming increase in the number of violent incidents and fatalities in the Maoist-related violence -- in 2008, 24 persons were killed in the state; this figure is now 38 only by June 21, 2009. Hastily concluded agreements with the Bharat Jakat Mavai Marwa and the People's Committee against Police Atrocities in November 2008only encouraged the Maoists to take on the state government in a more frontal way. Had it taken a more realistic view and not been influenced by narrow political considerations, maybe the ignominy of Lalgarh could have been avoided. Extraordinary administrative and political incompetence allowed the situation to deteriorate further.
It should be no consolation for the harried West Bengal government that the situation is much worse in the neighbouring states or for the central government that the Maoist violence has badly exposed state's inept handling of the problem. The Centre and state need to cooperate and not throw mud at each other. The new Union home minister, P Chidambaram, is a vast improvement on his clueless predecessor. It should be possible for the states, including West Bengal, to do business with him. The Centre has done right by declaring the Maoists as a terrorist organisation. It should now be possible for the state governments to take action against them and their associates under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act.
A Lalgarh-type security action is only a short-term remedy. The Maoists cadre will run away under police and paramilitary pressure and merge into local population and wait for a more opportune time to challenge the state government. This long-term problem needs a national multi-dimensional strategy. Political dialogue with the Maoists has little meaning unless the government demonstrates its will and capacity to remove the social and economic injustices of a long-suffering people, especially the tribals. The whole system of delivery of essential service like health, education and communication has virtually broken down in the worst-affected areas and need complete overhauls. The rule of law needs to be strictly enforced irrespective of any political considerations, but this can be achieved only if the police at all levels are allowed to do their job in a professional manner and the criminal justice system made more effective.
The writer is is a security analyst.
