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ShareMost of us tend to be cynical whenever the government launches a major scheme and this is possibly true of the proposed National Identity Card.When a public venture costs the exchequer a tidy sum -- Rs1.5 lakh cr -- our cynicism gets compounded by fears of how much of that money will be gobbled up by unscrupulous middlemen. The government should take steps to address these concerns.
The project has begun with the high-profile appointment of Nandan Nilekani, which is a coup of sorts, to head the Unique Identity Authority (UIA) within the Planning Commission. In agreeing to do the job, Nilekani is staking a reputation for dynamism and professionalism built over decades. There could be many roadblocks in his way, as in all such huge projects. It will be the duty of Planning Commission chairman, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, and others to ensure that ordinary rules of business that cripple a government wanting to march forward, do not frustrate the grandiose project.
But that said the public is entitled to ask a few questions. There has to be transparency of the highest order. We will do well to draw from the experience of Britain which, after years of toil, is still struggling to make a national ID not only viable and but also acceptable. Introduced by the Labour party, it has been opposed tooth and nail by both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats.
Their objection is that such a card would result in invasion of privacy and there is real danger of possible abuse of data by the government. A few recent instances of loss of data in the possession of government departments have added grist to their mill. For Labour, until recently, the scheme was something of a dogma. But lately, even within that party, there are cracks. The card was first mooted when Tony Blair was prime minister in 2006, who staked his image and resources to make it the party's showpiece scheme. Gordon Brown, in his first months in office, did not share his predecessor's enthusiasm. By the government's own admission, support is now only 60 per cent. Former home secretary David Blunkett, who piloted it under Blair with great verve, has also done a somersault. As things stand now, the first cards will be out only next year, and will cover only airport workers, foreigners and students. A year later, every applicant for a new passport will be required to produce the national ID. In the US, the driving licence is still a sort of national ID and rightly so, given that it is an automobile-obsessed nation. The Social Security Number, introduced in the 1980s, complements this, and has been employed to keep track of immigrants and students. The fact that 9/11 still happened is a poor advertisement for the concept of a national ID the world over.
Let us not delude ourselves into believing that the ID will be an antidote to terrorism. Not the least. An ID could halt a suspect when he is confronted in an airport or other immigration posts. Most of the terrorists who have attacked our cities are those who had avoided traditional routes. It will assign a unique number to every citizen that he will use for all his transactions. This will be akin to the PAN number that is now in vogue. Governments in this country are now notorious for distributing freebies indiscriminately and it is widely known that these are garnered largely by those who are not entitled to them. A tamper-proof ID should be able to greatly check such abuse.
As for concerns of a Big Brother snooping over us with the help of a national ID, a lot will depend on what goes into the smart card. Initially, the ID will carry mainly the name, address, photograph and a biometric feature such as fingerprints. There is a press report however that it will incorporate as many as 16 pieces of information. We need to know what all these will be.
The temptation will be to slowly expand the data stored, so as to include credit card number, insurance policies held and personal health history (including the DNA profile) of the holder. It is this anxiety which is touted by many opposed to a national ID. The compromise of such information is a real danger. A centralised database that is vulnerable to the attacks of a hacker is therefore not recommended by some experts. Instead, the data may be held in several databases. Experience internationally is that any ID can be faked and a copied ID in the hands of a terrorist will give him a 'super security pass'.Nilekani and his team will be naïve to accept anything less than the most exacting security standards. The pilot project now under way in 12 states and one Union Territory should reveal some of the loopholes from which lessons can be drawn.
Educating the public, especially the youth, on the finer details of the scheme, within the constraints imposed by security requirements and building a consensus across the political spectrum is the need of the hour.
The writer is a former director of CBI.
