Bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have been a source of concern for the international community for long and attract scrutiny unlike any other bilateral relationship, with the possible exception of the Israeli-Palestinian one.
It is no surprise, therefore, that every time India and Pakistan decide to talk with each other, it is hailed as a new beginning. The meeting between the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers on the sidelines of the recent Saarc summit in Thimpu had generated huge media buzz; the announcement of visits to Pakistan by the home minister and the external affairs minister in June and July will generate its share of frenzy. But the mere announcement of talks is unlikely to resolve the structural problems that confront India’s relationship with Pakistan.
The idea of Pakistan was premised on the belief that Muslims of south Asia needed a separate homeland from what was seen as a Hindu-dominated India. And so a Muslim-majority state, Pakistan, came into being that derived its identity in opposition to India. This need to view India as an adversary has been a constant in Pakistan’s politics and foreign policy since its inception. The armed forces of Pakistan have historically viewed themselves as guardians of the Pakistani identity.
Like any other state, Pakistan also aimed to preserve and enhance its security vis-à-vis its much stronger regional rival, India. The two states have been in a perpetual state of security dilemma ever since their independence in 1947. Given India’s economic, military and geographical advantages, Pakistan has relied on non-conventional means to limit India’s influence and power. It pursued nuclear weapons in order to prevent India from using its overwhelming conventional military superiority, thereby levelling the playing field.
Under the nuclear umbrella, Pakistan has used terrorism as a major instrument of its foreign policy, especially in Jammu and Kashmir. Despite recent positive developments, nothing much has changed in the above narrative. The Indo-Pak peace process also hinges on the ability of Pakistan’s political establishment to control terrorist groups from wrecking havoc in India. It is doubtful how much control the civilian government in Islamabad can exert given that various terrorist outfits have vowed to continue their jihad in Kashmir.
The Frankenstein’s monster that the Pakistani state had created to further its strategic objectives vis-à-vis its adversary has now turned against it and threatens to devour any future attempts at Indo-Pak reconciliation. Moreover, there is little evidence of any significant Pakistani effort to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism such as communications, launching pads, and training camps on its eastern border with India.
Finally, and perhaps most important from the point of view of the issue of Kashmir, is the very different strategic goals India and Pakistan have in pursuing a peace process. Pakistan would like to change the status quo in Kashmir while India would like the very opposite. These are irreconcilable differences and no confidence-building measure will alter this situation. India’s premise largely has been that the peace process will persuade Pakistan to cease supporting and sending extremists into India and start building good neighbourly ties.
Pakistan, in contrast, has viewed the process as a means to nudge India to make concessions on Kashmir. While Pakistan shows little sign of budging from its demands on Kashmir, nobody really knows what India wants from the peace process. It is obvious that India will not give up its control over Kashmir, but then what is it bringing to the negotiating table for Pakistan to take it seriously?
And this is primarily a function of the lack of national political consensus on this issue in both states. In Pakistan, not only radical Islamic groups but also many mainstream political parties are against what they view as Islamabad’s current soft line towards the Kashmir issue. In India, the present Congress-led government will find it difficult to make any concessions as it would have to protect its flank from the political right.
While there is a consensus on opening up trade routes and bus services, the threat of terrorism keeps all political parties on guard as no one would want to be held responsible for a terrorist attack that might come.
Given the current predicament, it is difficult to be optimistic that the Indo-Pak peace process is poised to move beyond initial pleasantries and cricket matches. Without greater internal political and institutional reforms in Pakistan, the state of India-Pakistan ties will remain as abysmal as it is today.
Long-term peace in South Asia largely hinges on the ability of the international community to convince Pakistan’s political and military elite that without political reforms, Pakistan’s future will continue to be shaped by its past and that would be a tragedy for the entire region.
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