Comment

From most newspaper reports, it would seem as if the 10 Mumbai terrorists were deadly professionals. While there is no doubt they got adequate training in the use of machine guns and grenades, it’s clear that their mission was not accomplished.

When the definitive history of the Mumbai terror attacks is written, one shouldn’t be surprised if the Terrible Ten looked more like Bumbling Bimbos, subject to all the rigours of Murphy’s Law: things that could go wrong, did.

Consider what they really “achieved”: the killing of 163 citizens, substantial damage to the Taj hotel, some damage to the Oberoi, and brutal murders at Nariman House. Barring the last one, which looked like anti-Jewish vendetta, the only real “gains” were in getting prime-time TV coverage and in destroying confidence levels between India and Pakistan. Quite clearly, this serves the Pak Army’s agenda — and theirs alone.
In every other way, the terrorists came across as blundering amateurs. After the audacious landing off Colaba and the initial fracas at Leopold café, the Terrible Ten reached their predetermined spots at the Taj, Oberoi, Nariman House and CST Station without mishap.

But after the initial killings in all three places (excluding Nariman House), they didn’t seem to know what to do next. The Taj terrorists killed a few people and headed up thestairs. Between this initial break-in and the time the marine commandos entered the picture, they had the Taj almost to themselves. The NSG didn’t arrive till morning. Did the terrorists go about methodically planting bombs and detonating them? No. Did they take hostages in bulk to use them as bargaining chips in a long-drawn war of wits? No.
The hotel’s internal CCTV captured them on camera, and they were seen banging at rooms and restaurant doors.

Without much success. The hotel staff quietly asked guests to stay inside, and those outside to stay out. Despite all the leeway given by the commandos, the terrorists apparently didn’t know what they were supposed to do. Were they waiting for a call from Pakistan? Their handlers didn’t come good in their moment of crisis.
At the Oberoi, after the initial murders at the restaurant, they managed to box themselves in between two sets of commandos. Few guests offered themselves as prey.

The biggest mix-up happened at CST, where the terrorists behaved like babes in the wood. After the initial bursts of gunfire, they dashed towards the subway connecting CST to the other sidewalks, but then retreated, fearing claustrophobia. They tried another exit route from the station — this time finding the skywalk connecting CST to The Times of India building.

They even managed to get themselves photographed for the occasion. They ran towards the Cama without knowing it was a hospital under substantial renovation. They made a hasty exit when they found no patients — an alert staffer had herded them into another room. On their way down with the liftman as hostage, they encountered cops, whom they killed. As they headed out of the building, they ran into their first big stroke of luck — ATS chief Hemant Karkare, additional CP Ashok Kamte and encounter specialist Vijay Salaskar, all in one police Qualis. The inevitable happened and the AK-47s mowed them down. This was the terrorists’ biggest success — our gift to them — and they didn’t know it till much later.

But their luck ran out. The Qualis developed a puncture; they commandeered a Skoda from someone at gunpoint and then tried to head for the seafront. After taking the wrong turn, they headed to Girgaum Chowpatty — where the police finally cornered them and captured one of them alive.

When so many things go wrong, it is right to ask ourselves: were they really all that professional? The more sinister question, though, remains: if they didn’t execute their bigger plans because they lost contact with their Pakistani minders, then maybe the horror is not over yet. A chilling thought.
Email: r_jagannathan@dnaindia.net