Uniform strategy

The jury is still out on whether prime minister Manmohan Singh made the right move by meeting Pakistan’s president Asif Zardari on the sidelines of the BRIC and SCO Summit meet at Yekaterinburg in Russia. Before the meeting, the Pakistani delegation, especially their foreign minister, seemed elated about the prospect, as this would allow the past to be buried, particularly after the embarrassing disclosures and evidence that emerged from the terror attacks in Mumbai last year about Pakistan’s terror machinery.

Before our elections, the pressure on Pakistan was working well. But our foreign office mandarins dozed off into slumber just as their political masters hit the road for the elections. Islamabad used this period well to earn global sympathy as a ‘victim of terror’.

And at least Pakistan’s civilian leadership — their military being a law unto itself — was hoping that the Yekaterinburg meeting would allow for the revival of the Indo-Pak bilateral dialogue. But soon after Singh made it known —  as the meeting commenced — that he was in fact only using the incidence to remind Pakistan of its obligation to do a lot more to address India’s concerns, Pakistani smiles began to fade away.

As a face saver, both sides agreed that their foreign secretaries would meet to try and move the composite dialogue process forward. This was shelved in 2007 when Musharraf got tied down in domestic turmoil. In any case, whatever headway was made in the process was apparently through secret parleys. Therefore the meeting of foreign secretaries could be an exercise in futility, more so, as Pakistan has been dragging its feet on nailing those behind the Mumbai massacres.

The reason for that is essentially the unwillingness on the part of Pakistan’s rigidly anti- Indian military establishment to do more. The ISI too is a part of Pakistan’s military. And Pakistan’s military-intelligence nexus regards its terror infrastructure on the Indo-Pak border, with the likes of Masood Azhar, Hafeez Sayid and Zikrur Lakhvi  of the LeT and other similar dubious outfits that Ajmal Kasab and his team were a product of, as a ‘strategic asset’ to be used against India. Moreover it also knows that militarily, India’s ability to hit at the terror camps on its borders is not an option that New Delhi could easily exercise.       

Following the public outcry after the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai, there was talk of a military punishment for Pakistan, possibly with surgical air strikes and/or cross-LoC commando attacks on terror camps in PoK. Legally, this was defensible on the grounds that even PoK is technically Indian territory as Jammu & Kashmir had acceded to India in 1947 and India could target terrorists within.

But Pakistan regards PoK as its territory and has made known to India on more than one occasion since 1987, that its ‘threshold of patience’ would be essentially limited to the crossing of its borders by Indian troops or India’s Air Force. If that were to happen it would then respond with all its military force and would be willing to even use nuclear weapons to stop an Indian military attack on Pakistan.

This therefore is the new dimension that has emerged in the Indo-Pak military equation and the low intensity conflict battles that were being fought largely in Jammu & Kashmir.  And with the fear that the Pakistani initiated  uprising in Kashmir would soon become a lost rebellion, the minders of separatists within the Valley have initiated a new move — after eight months of peace and a successful  election process — by rallying locals to hit out at the police in a few key towns. Their aim is to show that Kashmiris are being hurt and harassed by New Delhi’s hardline approach, and are victims of human rights abuses. Therefore an early settlement of the Kashmir issue (read secession of Kashmir into Pakistan) is a must.

Clearly Pakistan’s leaders are unable to find any other bonding adhesive that can keep their turmoil-ridden country together. But a question rarely ever put to them — out of diplomatic nicety or plain ignorance — is what happens if the Kashmir issue is settled? What will Pakistan want from India thereafter? Perhaps, the break up of India into parts none big enough to overshadow Pakistan?

There are many who argue that we must keep talking with Pakistan. Others say that by talking with Pakistan’s civilian leadership India would accord them credibility. But unlike India, as all of Pakistan’s key decisions are made by generals in GHQ Rawalpindi and not by civilians in Islamabad, India could for a start insist that if a lasting solution is desired then the Pakistan’s army brass must be a part of any future dialogue. Without them, getting diplomats to talk is a waste of time and public money.

The writer is is the author of Wars and no Peace over Kashmir