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ShareDuring the US presidential election campaign last year, when 'Obama mania' was sweeping the world, policy wonks in China were observing the faraway electoral race with some mild trepidation. Their concerns were rooted in two perceived realities: First, front-runner Obama was a Democratic candidate, whereas Republican presidents, with their free-trade agenda, have traditionally been good for China. Second, Chinese leaders felt that if the charismatic Obama were to be elected as the first black president of the US, he would have the capacity to change the world's perceptions about US for the better, which would work to China's disadvantage as it competes for power and influence around the world.
Now, however, Chinese leaders will presumably have no more reason to be wary of Obama's 'halo effect'. For one thing, the Obama of today, after barely nine months in office in a hyperpartisan political environment, is a mere shadow of the inspirational, lyrical man who campaigned on lofty promises to unite America and heal the world. His domestic political appeal is rapidly diminishing; and, as a recent parody on the Saturday Night Live show noted with some exaggeration, if he has accomplished anything at all, the world is yet to hear of it.
Additionally, earlier this week, Obama faced the first defining test of his mettle to determine whether he would stand his ground, or yield to China on an issue that has more symbolic than substantive significance -- a White House photo-opportunity with the visiting Tibetan leader Dalai Lama.
Obama's response was to signal his extreme sensitivity to Chinese sentiments by declining to meet the man whom Chinese leaders respectfully call "the jackal in a monk's robe". In so doing Obama became the first US president in 18 years to not receive the spiritual leader who fled Tibet for India following the Chinese invasion of 1959, and represents Tibetan aspirations for an autonomous homeland.
(To be fair, Obama plans to make some critical concessions to Indian sensitivities as well -- in the choice of the menu for the state banquet he will host in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's honour later this month. Obama will likely pass up his favourite dish of shrimp and scallops in hot garlic butter in favour of a more traditional meat dish that might better suit the culinary interest -- and digestive capabilities -- of the septuagenarian visitor.)
At one level, Obama's genuflective gesture towards China, which comes barely a month ahead of his planned visit to that country, is being projected as a "pragmatic" move that's intended to secure China's goodwill on a whole range of issues where its support is critical. These include the nuclear crises involving North Korean and Iran (where China's leverage with both countries and its vote in the UN Security Council are decisive factors), reviving global economic growth (for which Chinese spenders need to do some heavy lifting), and even climate change (given China's dubious reputation as the world's biggest polluter).
The 'deal' marks the translation into action of the new US "vision for a China partnership" that was outlined just last month by US deputy secretary of state James Steinberg. In the opaque but upbeat language of diplomacy, the new policy is called "strategic reassurance".
As Steinberg outlined it, strategic reassurance rests on a "core, if tacit, bargain": China's "arrival" as a prosperous and successful power would be welcomed; in turn, China "must reassure the world that its rise will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others." Bolstering that bargain, Steinberg added, "must be a priority in the US-China relationship."
For all the spin that is put on it, however, Obama's action symbolically represents, as nearly as any single event may, China's 'taming' of the US, on account of the latter's economic enfeeblement at the present moment -- and its heavy indebtedness to China. America's current predicament is, of course, not Obama's fault: After all, these were problems he inherited from the previous administration. But by starting off his engagement with China with what is perceived (and not just by an inflamed, reflexively critical Republican right-wing) as a weak-kneed response, Obama has set a precedent that may compel him to walk on the eggshells of Chinese sensitivities for a long time.
The question that arises is this: How far will the Obama administration's policy of "strategic reassurance" with China go in placating Chinese sensitivities? What happens when China's "sensitivities" conflict with the interests of other countries? These aren't academic questions: As a militarily overstretched, economically enfeebled America strikes "bargains" that effectively pass the Asian baton to China, it bodes ill for the interests of other players.
A tribal proverb from Kenya, from where Obama's father hailed, notes that when elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. Much the same fate awaits Asian grasslands when elephants work out strategic bargains.
