
Prime minister Manmohan Singh is fully engaged in foreign policy, and he needs a foreign minister who agrees with him. But he has foreign ministers with whom he does not see eye-to-eye, or those who do not articulate what he wants.
During UPA1, he was not exactly happy with Natwar Singh. The former IFS officer and Rajasthan royal seemed to belong to a bygone Third World era. At least, that was the impression that the media created of him, and Natwar Singh partly contributed to that by speaking in the old manner, with a sneaking sympathy for Third World countries, including the dictators, and barely concealed stridency against the Americans and others in the West.
Manmohan Singh put up with the pinpricks of Natwar's presence while pushing what he thought was the need of the hour - the India-US civil nuclear deal and strategic ties with the US. Then came the Volcker report on the oil-for-food scam in Iraq. Natwar Singh's son and associates were mentioned in it. He was forced to resign, and the prime minister heaved a visible sigh of relief.
Whatever the implications of Natwar Singh's involvement in the scam, and no one really followed it up after his resignation, it was clear that the main issue was that Natwar was out of sync with the prime minister on the all-important foreign policy. What it exposes is the fact that Manmohan Singh had to resort to subterfuge to get rid of the man.
In UPA2, it seemed that Manmohan Singh has got SM Krishna, the man he wanted as his foreign minister, but again there was subterfuge. Krishna is not known as a foreign policy expert. The only thing that was in Krishna's favour was that he was a Fulbright fellow. Critics and observers had another explanation. They argued that Krishna was chosen because Manmohan Singh wanted to run the foreign office himself, and Krishna is a weak minister.
The fiasco in Islamabad last week was not entirely Krishna's fault but it seemed Pakistan would have dealt with either a Pranab Mukherjee or P Chidambaram with greater restraint. But the media were keen to prove that Krishna did not have much of a clue about the byzantine complexities of foreign policy.
Natwar Singh became a scapegoat for one reason, and Krishna is being made one for another. It is for the prime minister to choose the right man and trust his judgment. It is not good or wise to have foreign ministers who can be made scapegoats.
Mukherjee filled the gap creditably for three years after Natwar Singh. He was able to argue the case for the India-US civil nuclear deal more persuasively than even the prime minister in the debate in Lok Sabha. It is quite curious then as to why he was not once again considered for the job. Surely, you need a seasoned interlocutor in a crucial portfolio like foreign affairs.
Foreign policy is indeed the prime minister's preserve, and it has been so since Nehru's time. The foreign minister is meant to reflect the prime minister's thinking. In the case of Manmohan Singh, he does not seem to have found the right man who will articulate his views clearly and loudly.
The one person who is on the same wavelength as Manmohan Singh is human resource development minister Kapil Sibal, who has a panache for pronouncements and who could be the man for the job. This does not mean that what either Manmohan Singh or Kapil Sibal think is right.
