The spectre of 26/11 has returned to haunt the Mumbai police. On the run-up to the first anniversary of the terror attack, the cops have been dogged by controversies kicked up by a sensational statement by former Mumbai police commissioner Hasan Gafoor, and To The Last Bullet — a book penned by Vinita Kamte, additional commissioner of police Ashok Kamte’s widow. Her husband fell to the terrorists bullet, along with Hemant Karkare and Vijay Salaskar, on that fateful night. Gafoor, in a recent interview to a news magazine, has said that four senior officers had not responded to the call of duty during the attack. Vinita, in her just released book, has opened a can of worms. She has asked questions to which the police seem to have no answer. DNA analyses the controversies, seeking to find out what went wrong and why.
Karkare’s SOS ‘ignored’
In her book, Vinita has published crucial extracts from the wireless log of 26/11. The call logs showed that Karkare had asked the main control room to send reinforcement at the front gate of Cama Hospital. Transcript of the conversations as published in the book:
11.24 pm: Hemant Karkare (HK) to main control (MC): We are at Cama Hospital. Firing and grenade blasts are going on (in Cama Hospital), 3-4 grenade blasts have taken place in the last five minutes. We need to encircle Cama Hospital. We are near the SB2 office. Send a team from the front side of Cama Hospital. This needs to be CO-ORDINATED so that there is no cross-firing. Please ask KL Prasad, joint commissioner (law and order), to call in the army.
11.27 pm: MC: Sir, you need help from the front side of Cama. Correct?
11:28 pm: HK: ATS and QRT teams are here (at the rear gate of the hospital), and so is the crime branch team. Therefore, we need a team from the front side. We need to ENCIRCLE the Cama and surround it.
11.30 pm: MC: Noted sir.
There was no further talks between Karkare and the main control regarding reinforcement.
The book alleges
In spite of Karkare’s request, neither did the main control send in any reinforcement, nor did it update him on its status.
It could have been...
Just before Karkare had spoken to the main control room, additional commissioner of police (central) Sadanand Date, who was fighting the terrorists on the top floor of the Cama, too, had requested the control room for reinforcement. A police officer, who was in the control room on the night of 26/11, said that several requests for reinforcement came from Date’s wireless. Around 11.20 pm, Date requested for bulletproof jackets as well.
However, since there was no backup force in the vicinity, Date was told by the main control that it would take some time to send in reinforcement, and he would have to hold on till then. As the conversation was taking place over Motorola wireless system, others listening in, including Karkare, too would have known that no backup force was available. Around 11.58 pm, traffic police chief Sanjay Barve got in touch with the control room. He, too, asked for reinforcement at the Oberoi, and wanted to talk to Karkare.
Karkare spoke to Barve, and told him that he was at Cama Hospital. Barve asked Karkare if there was any spare police team in South Mumbai, which could be used to cordon off the Oberoi. Karkare told him that he would find out if anyreinforcement was available. He asked Barve to block traffic throughout the city so that no one would be able to escape.
That was the last time Karkare’s voice was heard on the wireless. Perhaps, the decision by the three officers (Karkare, Kamte and Salaskar) to go on their own to the front gate of the Cama had not been relayed to the main control. Karkare had left his wireless set with his operator, who did not travel in the ill-fated police vehicle. Around 12.15 am on November 27, police commissioner Hasan Gafoor tried to contact Karkare, but got no response. Later, trying Karkare’s wireless, the main control reached his operator, who told them that Karkare had gone inside the hospital. But even then the control room was not told that all three had gone in the same vehicle.
It was around 12.45 am that the main control got a call from Karkare’s wireless, which informed them that Karkare, Kamte andSalaskar had been injured in a firing, and were being taken to the hospital.
Contradictory orders
Call logs that showed that joint commissioner of police (Crime) Rakesh Maria had told Ashok Kamte to head for Cama Hospital, even though Gafoor asked him to go to the Trident
11.11 pm: East Region (Ashok Kamte’s) wireless [ER] to MC: Ask the commissioner of police as to which spot I am to report to?
11:13 pm: MC: I will call and ask.
MC to the police commissioner [CP]: Calling (fails to get through).
11.16 pm: MC to ER: Please sir, your present location?
ER: To reach Taj in 10 minutes.
MC: Noted sir.
[At this juncture, Maria takes over the control room]
11.17 pm: MC to ER: Crime sir [Maria] is asking about your exact location.
ER: Wadala passing, Wadala passing.
MC: Noted sir.
11.22 pm: ER: Approaching Zone 1 office.
MC: Understood sir.
ER: Orders for me?
MC: I will ask Crime sir and tell you.
11.24 pm: MC: There is an operation going on near the SB2 office. You go there.
Immediately after getting the instructions from the main control room, Kamte headed for Cama Hospital.
The book alleges
Kamte had been reportedly ordered to come to the Trident by Gafoor, and the control room knew about it. But in spite of that, Maria, who was in the control room, told him to go to Cama Hospital.
It could have been...
A police official said that the main control room was not aware that the police commissioner had asked Kamte to report at the Oberoi. In fact, the wireless log suggested that around 11.11 pm, Kamte called up the main control and asked them to find out from Gafoor where he was expected to report. The control room tried to contact Gafoor, but there was no response.
Then, around 11.22 pm, while approaching the General Post Office (GPO), Kamte got in touch with the control again, seekingfurther orders. Around the same time, Sadanand Date’s wireless operator got in touch with the control. He said that heavy firing was on at the Cama, and requested for immediate backup.
It was, perhaps, because of this urgent request that Kamte, who was nearby, was told to rush to the hospital.
Maria ‘lied’ to Gafoor
Gafoor [CP] calling Maria [M] on the wireless set:
12.45 am: CP: What are the locations of Mr Karkare and Kamte? And what is the situation about Central region (Sadanand Date)?
M: Sir… sir central region [Date] … is in Cama Hospital sir… and Ashok (Kamte) is near the SB office. He is covering the SB office, sir.
[Note: Calls to control rooms showed that the news of Kamte, Karkare and Salaskar being injured in gun-battle came in at 12.25, 12.33 and 12.49 am]
CP: What about Mr Karkare?
M: Sir… sir… he.. he.. he.. Hemant [Karkare] was, sir, at CST railway station, sir. I will find out the location and tell him to get in touch with you right away, sir.
[Note: The control room call logs showed that Karkare had given his location at the Cama at 11.24, 11.27, 11.28 and 11.58 pm]
CP: I only want to know whether Mr Karkare and Kamte are injured, or are they safe? And similarly has central region (Date) got any medical aid, and similarly all other injured been provided with medical aid?
M: Sir, trying to do that, sir. Sir, as for the report… that there was firing on east region (Kamte’s) vehicle, [but] nobody is injured sir. Central region I am not
able to get through [sic]. As soon as I get through,
I will get back to you.
CP: You will send a party to rescue them.
M: Already done, sir.. Already done, sir. Additional CP (crime) and three units of the crime branch are on the job, sir.
CP: Noted.
The book alleges
Maria knew that Karkare, Kamte and Date were injured, but did not inform Gafoor about it. He did not tell the commissioner that Karkare had been injured near the Cama. Instead, he told him that Karkare was at the CST. Maria also told Gafoor that he had sent Deven Bharti to help Date. But Bharti never reached the hospital.
It could have been...
According to the control room, it was around 12.45 am they first came to know that Karkare, Kamte and Salaskar were injured, and were being taken to hospital. Before that, there had been no communication from anyone regarding the events at the Cama. Around 12.35 am, the control room tried to get in touch with Kamte on his walkie-talkie, but failed to get through. It was later known that Kamte’s wireless operator was with him, Karkare and Salaskar in the ill-fated police vehicle.
Also, since both Date and his wireless operator were injured in the gun-battle at the hospital, the news of the two terrorists [Ajmal Amir Kasab and Abu Ismail] leaving the hospital was not immediately relayed to the control room.
However, it is difficult to explain why Gafoor was misinformed by Maria about the locations of Karkare, Kamte and Date by Maria.
Where was the backup?
The book alleges that in spite of repeated requests by senior officials out on the field, reinforcements were not provided to them.
It could have been...
Senior officials who were present in the control room that night, and who spoke to DNA on conditions of anonymity, said that immediately after the attacks began, all available forces in South and Central Mumbai were diverted to the targeted areas. However, following the two bomb blasts in taxis — at Vile Parle and Wadi Bunder — it was suspected that other parts of the city might come under attack as well. “So, it was decided not to move the entire police force to South Mumbai. If any place in North or East Mumbai had been attacked, there would have been no cops to tackle the situation there,” the officer said.
Where was Deven Bharti?
The book alleges that additional commissioner of police [crime] Deven Bharti was sent out to help Sadanand Date, who had been injured in the Cama hospital gun-battle. But he never reached the hospital.
It could have been...
A crime branch officer said that Bharti had rushed towards Cama Hospital on hearing the news of it being attacked. A strategic decision was taken that since the terrorists were believed to be on the hospital terrace, Bharti, along with a handful of cops, would get on to the terrace of the adjacentAnjuman Islam High School and engage the fidayeen in a gun-battle. Bharti and his team did get on to the terrace of the school. They also saw some people moving on the hospital terrace. “However, it was too dark for us to make out whether they were terrorists or hospital staff or citizens,” said a policeman who was on Bharti’s team.
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