Book review: Henry Kissinger's 'On China'

Book: On China
Henry Kissinger
Allen Lane
586 pages
Rs899

Almost forty years ago, Henry Kissinger arrived in Beijing on a secret mission commissioned by the president of the United States of America. His brief was to re-establish relations between the USA and the People’s Republic of China, a state estranged from and unrecognised by that country and many others ever since its inception in 1949. Since then, Kissinger has visited China more than fifty times.
In this magisterial work, his aim is nothing less than “to explain the conceptual way the Chinese think about problems of peace and war and international order.”

Kissinger has been an able practitioner of realpolitik and diplomacy for half a century, but he is also a scholar who has studied Talleyrand, Metternich and Bismarck.

So it is not surprising that the book starts with a deep dive into China’s history and culture, for — as he explains — “different histories and cultures produce occasionally different conclusions... It is necessary to understand it”. We in India must pay serious attention to this advice about the importance of understanding your interlocutor in depth — or as Sun Tzu phrased it in his The Art Of War — “to have deep foreknowledge of the opponent.”

Kissinger starts by describing the evolution of China’s strategic culture, from its early history through the later and more turbulent years of conflict and semi-colonisation by Japan and the Western Powers. Whilst scanning this vast sweep of history, the narrative holds interest by maintaining a good pace, each chapter closing with a tantalising sentence that tempts the reader to turn the page, almost like a thriller.

Throughout are scattered several insights, such as Mao’s observation (“China and India are not doomed to perpetual enmity”) or the classical Chinese strategic precept that “not every problem has a solution”. Even if it did, “each solution leads to a new set of problems”, so a continuity of (personal) relationships becomes a vital ingredient of diplomacy. The centrepiece of the book, naturally enough, is Kissinger’s audacious secret journey to Beijing in 1971 to reconnect the USA with China. For both nations, this was a masterstroke against the Soviet Union, once China’s fraternal ally but now its enemy.

There follow detailed and perceptive sketches of the principal actors — Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to start with, and Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin later on in the story. Kissinger’s meticulous notes and his access to official archives make the verbatim accounts of his conversations fascinating reading, as they reveal the elliptical thinking and psychology of Mao, the subtlety of Zhou, or the earthy and practical wisdom of Deng.

Kissinger’s acute observation brings to life China’s face-off with the Soviet Union, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, the Tiananmen Square tragedy, Deng’s “reform and opening up” and China’s emergence as a 21st century superpower.

Since the book starts with a brief but penetrating account of the origins of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, which of Kissinger’s many inferences about China’s strategic posture are of relevance to India?

Two aspects stand out. First, Kissinger notes China’s pattern of “pre-emptive deterrence”— an aggressive foray whenever China feels vulnerable and encircled — designed more to derive psychological advantage than to inflict serious damage. The unstated lesson for India is not to allow itself to get drawn into an alliance (by whatever name called) to contain China.

Second, to engage China across a wide range of economic activity despite the current political and security divergences. Indeed, he points out what benefits such an approach has brought for Japan, Taiwan, ASEAN and for the USA itself.

On China is not without its faults. Kissinger seems to project his fascination with China’s ancient philosophy on to China’s leaders, almost endowing them with extraordinary qualities of perspicacity and wisdom as — with Confucian inscrutability — they make foreign policy formulation seem like moving pieces on a weiqi board (China’s version of chess). Surely the truth must be different.

Mao committed huge mistakes, and Zhou, the urbane and cultivated mandarin, must have acceded — even unwillingly — to some of them. As with all nations, China too has suffered in due measure through the human frailty, expediency, hubris or sheer miscalculation of its rulers.
Finally, we await Kissinger’s verdict on the 64 trillion dollar question: what next for China, and the world? His answer is clear. He doubts that China seeks war or world domination, and his counsel to the USA is to embark on a process of co-evolution with China to create a Pacific Community for mutual benefit. India too could profit from a similar course: a full-throated economic engagement with China — whilst keeping our powder dry — will be better for us than engaging in a ruinous arms race, suspicious containment or remaining in sullen isolation. Which road will we take?

— Ravi Bhoothalingam has travelled extensively in China and has a working knowledge of Mandarin