Book Review: Sikkim- Requiem for a Himalayan Kingdom

Book: Sikkim- Requiem for a Himalayan Kingdom

Author: Andrew Duff

Publisher: Random House

Pages: 320

Rs: 599

In 1975, when Indira Gandhi was going from strength to strength, having flexed muscles in the 1971 Bangladesh war and conducted a nuclear test in 1974, she decided to annex the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim. She was concerned that Sikkim may show tendencies of wanting independence and become a United Nations (UN) member as Bhutan had done in 1971. She was also concerned that the three Himalayan kingdoms – Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal – were cosying up to each other. The last king or 'Chogyal' of Sikkim, Palden Thondup Namgyal, had attended King Birendra's coronation in Kathmandu in 1975.

On the morning of April 6, 1975, the roar of army trucks climbing the steep streets of Gangtok woke up the king. The 5,000-strong Indian force didn't take more than 30 minutes to subdue the palace guards, and Sikkim ceased to exist as an independent kingdom.

Andrew Duff's Sikkim: Requiem For a Himalayan Kingdom tells the story of Sikkim's annexation, its last king and his American wife Hope Cooke and their 'fairytale' wedding in 1963.

In the years leading to the 1975 annexation, there was enough evidence that all was not well between New Delhi and Gangtok. It is also said that the real battle was not between the Chogyal and Kaji Lendup Dorji, leader of the Sikkim National Congress, who had an ancestral feud with the Chogyal's family, but between their wives. On one side was Queen Hope Cooke and, on the other, Kaji's Belgian wife, Elisa-Maria Standford. And then there was a third woman, Indira Gandhi, in New Delhi.

The seeds were sown as far back as 1947, when the Sikkim State Congress launched an anti-monarchist movement to merge with India. Pro-democracy leader CD Rai recalls meeting Jawaharlal Nehru: "He told us, 'We'll help you with democracy and getting rid of feudalism, but don't talk about a merger now.'" The Chogyal later included Rai in a five-member council of ministers to sign the treaty with India, which would effectively turn Sikkim into an Indian "protectorate".

Chogyal had met 24-year-old New Yorker Hope Cooke in Darjeeling in 1963 and married her. The Cold War was at its peak. There was a tendency in India to see a 'foreign handf behind everything, so it was not unusual for the American queen to be labelled a CIA agent. Former foreign secretary KS Bajpai denies these claims now, but admits the marriage greatly influenced events in Sikkim.

However, as Sikkim's relations with Delhi deteriorated, so did Cooke's marriage with the Chogyal. In 1973, she returned to New York with her two children. She hasn't returned to Sikkim since. Then there was Elisa-Maria, daughter of a Belgian father and German mother, who left her Scottish husband in Burma and married pro-democracy leader Dorji in Delhi in 1957. She wanted to be Sikkim's First Lady, but Hope stood in the way.

During the British Raj, Sikkim had a 'subordinate alliance' with the Crown. At the time of India's independence, New Delhi acknowledged its special status and concluded a treaty with Sikkim in December 1950, recognising it as a 'protectorate'. India was responsible for external affairs, defence and communications, while Sikkim enjoyed autonomy in internal affairs, subject to India's ultimate responsibility for maintaining law and order.

This treaty was concluded against the backdrop of the Chinese invasion of Tibet and the treaties concluded by India with the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan.

India is accused of using people of Nepali origin in Sikkim, who were in a majority and opposed to the Chogyal. The anti-Chogyal parties swept to power in the election of 1974. They promptly introduced a new Constitution and sought Sikkim's association with India. In turn, New Delhi amended its own Constitution to "absorb" Sikkim.

Experts are still debating whether constitutional amendments can override an international treaty. In an earlier book, Sunanda K Datta-Ray underlined the absurdity of an international treaty being superseded by an amendment of the Indian Constitution. "Such egregious legal legerdemain was possible because of Indira Gandhi's parliamentary majority – though it must be added that most opposition parties willingly went along with it," he wrote.

The Chogyal himself misstepped in his unwillingness to grant full democratic rights to the Nepali majority and in his attempt to simultaneously take on India. In contrast, the Bhutanese monarch handled the relationship with India skillfully, and by 1971, secured entry into the UN.

Duff's book highlights how India seldom shied from using force when its security – especially territorial – is threatened. The accession of Junagadh, Hyderabad, Manipur and Jammu & Kashmir were all through military means.

But it must be noted that a peaceful and economically-integrated neighbourhood were the only guarantees to prosperity. Security cannot be delinked from prosperity and keeping a population with force, against its will, can lead to a perpetual national security problem.