Judge Loya case: In scathing verdict, SC says PILs being used to ‘settle extra-judicial’ scores

On Thursday, a bench comprising Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra and Justices AM Khanwilkar and DY Chandrachud dismissed the demand for a probe into Judge Loya’s death, stating categorically that there was no reason to doubt the statements of the four judges on the circumstances leading to Judge Loya’s death and that the documents placed on record showed that his death was due to a natural cause.

Interestingly, in a strongly-worded 114-page judgement, the SC bench had an illuminating take on the what it called the practice of ‘brazen misuse of PILs’ by ‘persons with personal agenda’. The noted that powerful judiciary tool had become a tool for advocates seeking publicity and was at times ‘used by petitioners to at the behest of business or political rivals to settle scores’.

The judgement noted that such ‘frivolous or motivated petitions’ detract from the time and attention which courts must devote to genuine cases. The bench observed that the PIL was a tool for people unable to seek justice by reasons of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy and are faced with a deprivation of fundamental human rights.

They wrote: “Bonded labour and under trials (among others) belong to that category. The hallmark of a public interest petition is that a citizen may approach the court to ventilate the grievance of a person or class of persons who are unable to pursue their rights. Public interest litigation is in that sense a valuable instrument and jurisdictional tool to promote structural due process.” The bench called it it a travesty of justice that resources of the legal system had to be consumed by an avalanche of ‘misdirected petitions purportedly filed in public interest’.

It noted: “There is a grave danger that if this state of affairs is allowed to continue, it would seriously denude the efficacy of the judicial system by detracting from the ability of the court to devote its time and resources to cases which legitimately require attention. Worse still, such petitions pose a grave danger to the credibility of the judicial process.”

Such PILs, the bench wrote has the propensity of endangering the credibility of other institutions and undermining public faith in democracy and rule of law, and it would continue to happen when the agency of the court was used to ‘settle extra-judicial scores’.

The judgement read: “Business rivalries have to be resolved in a competitive market for goods and services. Political rivalries have to be resolved in the great hall of democracy when the electorate votes its representatives in and out of office. Courts resolve disputes about legal rights and entitlements. Courts protect the rule of law.

 But as the submissions have evolved, it has become clear that the petition is a veiled attempt to launch a frontal attack on the independence of the judiciary and to dilute the credibility of judicial institutions. We must in this context record what we have heard during the course of the submissions.”

Calling the current PIL a ‘case in point’, the bench name-checked various attorneys and pulled them up. Dushant Dave was reprimanded for not believing in judicial officer and casting aspersion on the administrative committee of the Bombay High Court. Indira Jaising was chastised for requesting the court to issue contempt notices to the administrative committee of the Bombay HC.

The bench added that even the justices hearing the case hadn’t been spared and that Bhushan had argued that the present bench (Justice Khanwilkar and Justice Chandrachud) were judges of the the Bombay HC and may have known the judicial officer who submitted statements.

The judgement rebuked Prashant Bhushan ‘for adopting a dual mantle, assuming the character of a counsel for intervenor and an individual personally interested on behalf of the intervening organisation of which he is a member’.

The bench further wrote: “We informed Mr Bhushan that a decision as to whether a judge should hear a case is a matter of conscience for the judge. There is absolutely no ground or basis to recuse. Judges of the High Court hear intra court appeals against orders of their own colleagues. References are made to larger Benches when there are differences of view. Judges of the Supreme Court hear appeals arising from judgments rendered by judges of the High Courts in which they served, either as judges or on appointments as Chief Justices. The conduct of the petitioners and the intervenors scandalises the process of the court and prima facie constitutes criminal contempt.”

Contemplating launching contempt of court cases, the bench chose not to invoke proceedings stating that the credibility of the judicial process was based on its moral authority and not fear of coercive law of contempt.

They wrote: “However, on a dispassionate view of the matter, we have chosen not to initiate proceedings by way of criminal contempt if only not to give an impression that the litigants and the lawyers appearing for them have been subjected to an unequal battle with the authority of law.”

The bench hoped that the Bar of the nation was resilient enough to withstand such attempts and that the judiciary could perform its duty even if ‘it wasn’t palatable to some’.