Uri attack shouldn't be just another 'red line' for India on Pakistan

The terrorist attack on the Indian Army installation in Uri area of Baramulla in Jammu and Kashmir, which cost the lives of 17 soldiers, could keep the Pakistan policy of the Modi government on the pedestal of a dramatic change.

The attack, biggest in many years as far as casualties go, came on the eve of India’s planned intervention at the upcoming United Nations General Assembly meet where New Delhi is to highlight Pakistan’s terror atrocities not just across the border, but in areas such as Balochistan as well.

The loss of 17 Indian soldiers should not become just another number conceded to Pakistan’s growing audacity on executing cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. However, it is easy to slip into war cries during such situations, with national sentiments running high for a befitting military response. The Uri terror strike following the Pathankot one definitely calls for a complete re-visit to India’s overtures towards Pakistan, but it also begs the question of what kind of strategic change can be realistically achieved to expose and bring to justice Pakistan’s currently free-running military-jihad complex.

In such situations, it is very easy to talk tough and paint red lines for an adversary, specifically when one knows an escalation of the military kind can, in fact, become a quagmire economically for a country like India. Here, Islamabad does not have a lot to lose, but India does. This needs to be kept in perspective before deciding on any military-led decision making as a reaction to Uri if any such situation arises.

The main question for a reaction to Uri is currently more to keep the morale of the Indian armed forces up than a complete and outright military strategy shift, such as cross-border surgical strikes and so on. India almost went into full battlefront after the 2001 Parliament attack and pulled an unnatural yet critically required restrained reaction after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. So, for now, it is safe to say the Uri tragedy will in all probability not invoke any sudden change in a reactionary policy as far as the military option is concerned.

However, with the UNGA approaching, it is the perfect time for India to step up the pressure on Islamabad and the Pakistani Army, which so openly uses groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaesh-e-Mohammed (initial probe suggests JeM was behind the Uri strike) as its per need proxies. Rajnath Singh should look to conduct his planned visits to both Moscow and Washington at the earliest, to push the issue of Pakistan’s open sponsorship of terror groups. Even as the US still continues to support Pakistan with aid, it has shown signs of discontent and frustration with Islamabad over its failures to eradicate entities such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and, more importantly, the Haqqani Network, which the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), uses both to exert influence over the Taliban across the region and undermine India in Afghanistan.

Singh’s planned trip to Moscow is also needed to make sure Russia does not add further to Indian woes by selling military equipment to Pakistan. Both Russia and Pakistan are set to hold their first military exercises ever, slated to begin later this week. According to reports, Russia has also discussed the sale of arms to Pakistan, something Moscow, in today’s circumstances, is capable of doing irrespective of New Delhi’s concerns. India, meanwhile, could also look to build consensus against Pakistan with states such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, who border Pakistan and Afghanistan.

There are various ideas suggested by many scholars and analysts alike—other than the traditional military options—which India can use to suffocate the Pakistani jihadi complex. One common question that springs up is why the infiltrators are able to cross over into India with such ease— not just across the Line of Control, but the international border as well. For example, some have even asked whether the terrorists had prior information about the operational handover of the military camp at Uri which enabled them to target it at its weakest moment. The other idea to control Pakistan is economic and possibly the most suited by far. In short, build the Indian economy to such strength that dealing with Pakistan inherently becomes easier and more plausible, including the military model. Currently, questions are being raised about whether the Indian military depth is ready for a long, drawn-out military conflict with Pakistan.

The Uri incident will not be the ‘Pearl Harbor’ moment that many in TV studios and social media think it will be. The echo chambers of Indian public discourse on Pakistan think more from the heart than the head, perhaps even rightly so. However, the Uri tragedy should be seen more as a major event which India can magnify many times to sell Pakistan as an exporter of terror to the world rather than pushing for a full-scale armed conflict.