Words have been my habitat, ideas my oxygen, writing the meeting ground.
I write about love and longing, history and heartbreak, sex and satiation, music and memory, gender and jealousy and yes- even gobhis and governments.
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The police had captured him on the night of 26 November after he’d killed people at CST and then on the roads of South Mumbai.
For 60 hours as the hostage crisis at Taj, Oberoi and Nariman House unfolded-they had one of the terrorists in their captivity!!!
They had access to his cell-phone- and thus to his masters. They were in a position to extract information from him. He must have given them a pretty good idea of the extent of their plan, their firearms, and their goal. They could have used him for leverage against his instigators-or against the Pakistani Government (if you don’t stop your men now –we have one of yours –and we will use him to expose you internationally!). There were a million things they could have used Mohd. Ajmal Qasab for.
And yet, we see on CCTV footage at the Taj that before the NSG arrived policemen were running down the corridors without bullet proof vests without adequate firearms without forces to confront the enormity of the challenge.
Even after Qasab must have told them to what extent they had been prepared. Even when they could have surmised from his weaponry and his training where he had come from. Even when they must have known to what deadly extent their mission had been planned. Even when precious lives were at stake!
I can’t figure this out. Perhaps I don’t know enough. But will some one please explain why when we had captured one of the terrorists on the night of the 26th itself-and we were in a position of leverage and information-we didn’t act on it faster?
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