#dnaEdit | Scorpene submarine data leak: Overt sabotage

The leak of highly sensitive documents relating to the six Scorpenes being built at the Mazagon Dock Limited by French company DCNS has dealt another blow to India’s defence preparedness. There are worries that the leak of nearly 22,000 pages of documents, which were accessed by an Australian newspaper, has the potential to expose the combat and stealth capabilities of these submarines, particularly if they fall into the hands of India’s strategic rivals in the Indian Ocean: China and Pakistan. The defence ministry has sought to play down the impact of the leaks and claimed that the configurations laid down in the documents have undergone iterations, subsequently. With data pertaining to Scorpene sales to Malaysia and Chile also figuring among the leaks, it is believed that the theft occurred on the French side. This may come as a relief to the Indian Navy, which has struggled to overcome the 2005 war-room leak scandal involving the theft of India’s future naval defence preparedness plans.

But the vulnerability that has always existed when dealing with private defence companies and arms dealers, who have no scruples about selling the same products to India’s rivals, has gained another dimension with the data theft. The leak has happened just after DCNS snapped a US$38 billion deal to build Australia’s next generation of submarines. It has been speculated that the leak has been engineered by rival companies who lost the Australian deal to DCNS. If true, the perpetrators were seeking to sabotage the deal through undermining the French company’s trustworthiness. After all, disguising the stealth capabilities and their parameters is what makes the submarine such a potent weapon. But companies have only themselves to blame when they fall victims to hackers and corporate espionage. DCNS had entrusted the design documentation to consultants and sub-contractors for various aspects of the US$3.5 billion deal like translating documents from French to English, finalising the specifications, and procuring supplies of equipment and parts. It is hardly surprising then that DCNS lost the plot and its ability to keep tight control over who could access the documents.

A cavalier attitude towards sensitive data in its possession has already laid low top intelligence agencies like the US National Security Agency and commercial entities like banks, law firms in tax havens and online companies which hold customer data. In a highly networked world, data theft has implications for national security, corporate profits and privacy. The data leak has occurred just as the first of the Scorpenes are undergoing sea trials and weapons testing as before being commissioned into the Indian Navy. After allegations of kickbacks and missing the original deadline set for 2012, the Scorpene deal yet again exposes India’s difficulties with foreign defence procurement. 

Corruption allegations, cost escalation, disagreements over technical specifications and technology transfer, and muckraking by rival defence middlemen and companies have led to the touchy political and bureaucratic establishment drop crucial weapons purchases one after another. The jinxed Bofors, AgustaWestland, and the German HDW submarine contracts best exemplify these difficulties. This has led to the armed forces being saddled with an ageing and obsolete weaponry which puts strategic interest and personnel manning these weapons in danger. India’s aircraft and submarine fleet and artillery guns are just some of the casualties of the failure to indigenise the defence programme. Despite foreign suppliers proving unable to ensure prompt delivery and security of sensitive proprietary information, the unfortunate reality is that India’s options are limited.