#dnaEdit: Unceasing violence

The latest Maoist attack that killed 14 CRPF personnel at Sukma came just a day after Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh claimed the state would soon become Naxal-free. Singh was, perhaps, basing his optimistic assessment on the surrender of several CPI(Maoist) cadres in recent weeks. However, seven CRPF jawans were injured in an attack in this same region just last week proving that Maoists have not lost their ability to attack with deadly precision and planning. Media reports have also claimed that the Maoists were using civilians as human shields and that the CRPF exercised restraint to avert civilian casualties. If true, this is a courageous approach by the CRPF despite facing repeated criticism for strategic failures. Who is a Maoist, who is an Adivasi, is a question that has dogged security personnel when they have launched crackdowns in the aftermath of such attacks. With reports of cadre disillusionment with the Maoist leadership rife, this is an opportune moment for Chhattisgarh to intensify its overtures. However, the Centre and the states must be wary of surrender policies being misused by officials to corner monetary benefits, by fronting innocents as Maoists after promising them jobs.

Having identified South Chhattisgarh as the epicentre of the Maoist movement, a strategy of intense militarisation using paramilitary forces has been deployed for over a decade.  This has also been a period where mining, steel and power plants have brought in nearly Rs30,000 crore in investment into the mineral-rich, densely-forested and sparsely-populated state. When the questions of why Adivasis were joining the Maoist insurgency could be ignored no longer, a chastened Centre was compelled to admit that a development deficit existed, which the Maoists took advantage of. Almost as an afterthought, special funds and an integrated action plan for Left-wing extremism affected districts was formulated. Admittedly, reaching out to small villages in remote forested areas is a challenge for any administration. A constant excuse has been that Maoists are halting the construction of roads, schools and primary health centres. But the Indian State’s developmental track record in remote rural areas anywhere, irrespective of Maoist presence, is hardly encouraging. Nevertheless, successful models of a force-development twin strategy do exist. In Jangalmahal in West Bengal, once a Maoist stronghold, lies a cue that force can only be one, and not the sole, element of anti-Naxal operations.

The Trinamool Congress which allegedly struck an opportunistic alliance with the CPI(Maoist) in the 2011 assembly elections, distanced itself quickly, and following Kishenji’s elimination, embarked on such a multi-pronged development strategy. Mamata Banerjee’s special package involved recruiting nearly 10,000 tribal youth into the state police force, a drinking water project to solve the area’s water scarcity, bicycles for girl students and constructing new schools, hostels and hospitals. These actions quickly turned locals against the Maoists and helped central forces immensely in driving away the insurgents. But recent media reports from Kolkata indicate that many of the initial beneficiaries are upset over the failure to sustain development works and Maoists have again stepped up violence in Jangalmahal. In Chhattisgarh, Raman Singh’s electoral calling card has been a successfully implemented public distribution system. But there is little evidence of the seven insurgency-affected districts of Bastar having benefitted from jobs, education, dispensaries or other basic infrastructure facilities. In his pronouncements, home minister Rajnath Singh has advocated a tough line against Maoists. Even as the Centre moves to bolster the flagging morale of CRPF personnel, infuse funds and modernise equipment, it must also audit centrally sponsored schemes and ensure that their benefits reach the people.