Decoding America’s Afghan dilemma

This November would mark 14 years of the presence of American soldiers in Afghanistan. It was in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks in New York and Washington that then US president George Bush sent troops into Afghanistan to “smoke out” Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers. Because the Taliban, the Afghan Islamists refused to abandon Laden and Al Qaeda, they too were sucked into the war. 

The Americans scored a quick victory as the Taliban and Al Qaeda disappeared into the Tora Bora mountains to the east of the country. The Americans crafted a democratic constitution and facilitated the election of a parliament and a president. It, however, has turned out to be a deceptive military and political victory. The democratic regime of President Ashraf Ghani and that of his predecessor Hamid Karzai are seen as fragile regimes propped up by the Americans. It is not clear whether the democratic Afghans have the capability to fight and push back the Taliban once the American troops leave the country. 

The fall of Kunduz, an important urban centre in the north of the country, earlier this month to the Taliban, has exposed that the Afghan government and its security forces are not yet strong enough to repel the attacks of the Islamists. Kunduz has been retaken by government forces but that has not restored confidence in the democratically elected government in Kabul. This is the reason why President Obama and his military advisers have had to take the difficult decision late last week of allowing nearly 10,000 American troops to stay on in Afghanistan, at the bases in Bagram, Kandahar and Jalalabad.

This was how Obama explained his decision to extend American military stay in Afghanistan: “... as your Commander-in-Chief, I believe this mission is vital to our national security interests in preventing terrorist attacks against our citizens and our nation.” The American President is conceding that one of the major reasons he has to keep troops in Afghanistan is to avoid another 9/11. In other words, America has not really been able to defang the Islamic militants.

The Al Qaeda has been largely decimated and with the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011, it has even been decapitated. The Americans, however, now fear the continued spiral of global violence that has been unleashed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). There seems to be the irrational fear in the minds of American security experts that the ISIL can join hands with the Taliban as the Al Qaeda did in the late 1990s. There is an intriguing reference to this in Obama’s statement: “Pressure from Pakistan has resulted in more al Qaeda coming into Afghanistan, and we’ve seen the emergence of an ISIL presence.”

At the same time, the Americans are keen to mainstream the Taliban. And they seem to feel that Pakistan has a role to play in this. Obama said, “I’ll host Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan, and I will continue to urge all parties in the region to press the Taliban to return to peace talks and to do their part in pursuit of the peace that Afghans deserve.” The Americans seem to have realised that without bringing the Taliban into the political process, stability in Afghanistan would remain elusive. 

The role of Pakistan, no doubt, remains crucial in this reconciliation process. Islamabad, especially the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), believes they can exert political influence only through the Taliban. Pakistan and the Taliban are not too keen to allow the America-facilitated democratic process in Afghanistan to succeed. Obama needs to convince and use coercive diplomacy if needed, and to get Pakistan to cooperate in ensuring peace that endures in Afghanistan.