dna edit: Usual suspects

Starting with Yasin Bhatkal’s arrest last August, Indian security and intelligence agencies’ push against the Indian Mujahideen (IM) leadership in the country has gained momentum. With Tehsin Akhtar and Zia-ur-Rehman alias Wakas now in custody — and Delhi police filing charge sheets against 29 IM operatives in connection with the 2008 Delhi blasts — it might seem like a fine example of successful intelligence work. The cracks that have already appeared in the story show otherwise. Jurisdictional squabbles between the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Delhi police are one thing, but the contradictions in their respective narratives concerning the shoot-out at Jama Masjid in September 2010 are serious business. The former has pinned the attack on Asadullah Akhtar and Waqas, while the latter has Qateel Siddiqui and Mohammed Adil as the guilty parties. Given that Qateel was killed in jail in 2012, it may well be that the entire truth of the matter will never come out. But the confusion once again hammers home one of the main problems with counter-terrorism efforts here — a lack of credibility.

The IM came into the spotlight with a series of terror attacks across the country in 2008, targeting Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Delhi and Guwahati and claiming responsibility. But the organisation had been operating for years prior. Investigative reports by the media have alleged that security agencies have accreted evidence of the IM carrying out attacks since around 2003, from the 2006 Mumbai train blasts to blasts across UP between 2005 and 2008. Those arrested at the time, however, were not IM members. Thirteen Muslim youth, most associated with the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) took the fall for the Mumbai train blasts. Six SIMI activists were rounded up for the Jaipur blasts; the UP attacks were resolved in the same manner.

These discrepancies are not difficult to explain. Every terror attack brings with it tremendous political and public pressure to show results. In the absence of consistently effective intelligence work — the alerts sent out by various agencies, such as before the Delhi High Court blast, are often far too vague to be actionable — the security apparatus is playing catch-up more often than not. It becomes expedient to round up the usual suspects in order to show results. Confessions extracted by methods as dubious as the investigative work support the final result. Imran Kirmani is a case in point, arrested in 2006 and cleared by the court four years later. Others are not so fortunate. Faiz Usmani, allegedly an IM operative, was arrested in connection with the 2011 Mumbai blasts; he died in police custody. Walliullah continues to serve out a 10-year-sentence for the 2006 Varanasi Sankatmochan Mandir blast when his guilt remains a matter of debate.

These miscarriages of justice have created a widespread perception within the Muslim community of institutional biases, more often warranted than not, to the extent that the IM is dismissed as a false flag. The investigative agencies don’t seem to realise — or care — that this perception matters when it comes to their counterterrorism efforts. When it has become verboten to even speak of the role of communal riots in radicalising youth, as if to do so is to condone terrorism, the state security apparatus’s lack of credibility with regard to its investigations compounds the dishonesty of the conversation. The latest round of arrests could, unfortunately, turn out to be another example of how the process works.