DNA Edit: Not going great guns

After terrorist Burhan Wani’s death, the frequency of encounters between the Indian Army and Pakistan-sponsored terrorists has seen a strong tick upwards. With the intensity of these low-level conflicts escalating, one cannot be faulted for expecting the military bureaucracy and its infrastructure to be in lockstep with on-field soldiers. The ground reality, however, is a sorry one for which the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and its administrators are squarely to blame.

Sample this: The Indian Army in an internal evaluation has found that the assault rifles manufactured by the OFB have many faults; excessive recoil is one of the major shortfalls. The review also said that the indigenous rifles had an “excessive flash and sound signature” that made the gun indiscreet in combat situations. This is the second year in succession that the Army has rejected an OFB rifle. Last year, a rifle called the Excalibur was canned on the grounds that the rifle did not meet fire power requirement.

At a time, when the Indian Army is taking on Pakistan in a proxy war, this is another setback for our soldiers, who currently use AK-47s and INSAS rifles, which were inducted way back in 1988. In September 2016, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in its Request For Information has stated that the Army was in need of 1.85 lakh rifles, out of which 65,000 rifles were needed urgently. This urgent requirement, it seems, will take longer to be fulfilled. What’s more the output from OFBs seems to be in decline for the past few years. In the last three years, defence paraphernalia worth Rs 1,300 crore — which included 185 different variants of weapons and 70 types of ammunition, small arms and vehicles — had been deemed defective by the Directorate General of Quality Assurance and sent back.

Last year, the reserves of ammunition had run so low that India could have sustained only 14 days of intense conflict as opposed to the mandated norm of maintaining a stockpile that can last at least 40 days. In the aftermath of the Kargil war, a new lower limit titled Minimum Accepted Risk Level was set up which called for reserves to be set at 20 days. OFBs in India have found themselves incapable of meeting those targets as well. With the widening gap between requirement and production, training range sessions have taken a hit.

The Infantry is cutting back on shooting practice, tank regiments are cutting back on shell usage while artillery units are holding back on missiles stock. Notwithstanding the combative rhetoric on TV channels and cyberspace, the simple truth is that India currently lacks the firepower reserves to wage a Kargil-like war with Pakistan.