dna edit: A temporary peace

The probability of the Geneva agreement on Ukraine succeeding is best judged by the reactions of the two main players. Hours after the deal, US President Barack Obama’s less than enthusiastic assessment was that the US couldn’t “be sure of anything at this point.” His Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin went one better. Even as his diplomats were sitting around a table in Geneva with their US, EU and Ukrainian counterparts, Putin gave a remarkable performance in a four-hour question-and-answer show on Russian television. Among other things, he acknowledged for the first time that Russian troops had been involved in the annexation of Crimea, repeatedly used the historical term ‘new Russia’ to refer to southeast Ukraine, brought up old grievances against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and asserted that he had the authority to invade Ukraine.  These are not the statements of leaders who view the deal — where the disarmament of all illegally armed groups in eastern Ukraine, return of buildings seized by pro-Russian separatists to the authorities and amnesty for those who complied with the demands were agreed upon — as anything more than a pause in hostilities.

As matters stand, Putin has forestalled the US and the EU before they could tighten sanctions. This buys Putin time to keep eastern Ukraine simmering without directly implicating Moscow, using much the same tactics he has used so far — sending arms, money and military advisors across the border to stir up pro-Russian segments of the population in eastern Ukraine. It puts Kiev in a bind. If it deploys its military, it runs the risk of bloody clashes with its own people, giving Putin the handle he needs to intervene. If it goes in for a looser federal structure with more autonomy for various regions, it runs the risk of eastern Ukraine drifting even further into Russia’s orbit.

The US and EU are left with few immediate solutions. Sustaining the threat of heavy sanctions would be difficult given the EU’s reliance on Russian energy; in any case, Moscow has put the infrastructure to boost sales to east Asia in place, diversifying its options. However, more targeted sanctions aimed at Putin himself and Russian leaders could cause some pain. But if they are to be effective, they must be coupled with a visible reaffirmation of NATO’s commitment to vulnerable members like Poland and the Baltic states. Military exercises and an increased number of troops — not enough to be threatening to Moscow but as a message —  should both be on the table here.

Ukraine is a symptom of the broad incompatibility of Washington and Moscow’s worldviews. Putin’s reference to NATO’s perceived wrongs was more than showmanship; it points to his genuine anger at the diminishment of Russian influence in the post-USSR era. The understanding that the Soviets would permit German reunification in exchange for NATO not expanding eastward didn’t last long. His consequent concerns about national security are not entirely baseless. And to judge by his 80 per cent approval ratings within Russia, they are shared by Russians at large. Regardless, the pattern he has established of addressing these concerns via the use of military force, first in Georgia in 2008 and now in Ukraine, cannot be allowed to continue. Diplomacy of the kind seen at Geneva is well and good — but the US and EU must show that they have the wherewithal to inflict real economic pain if need be.