With ASEAN leaders in New Delhi, India hopes to build regional security architecture in Southeast Asia

India’s special commemorative summit with the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in New Delhi on January 25-26 is billed as a major diplomatic landmark. All the 10 ASEAN leaders would be chief guests at our Republic Day celebrations. Never before has there been a collective of so many foreign leaders for the R-Day parade. Usually, there is one guest of honour from a foreign country.

The ASEAN-India Summit is the first such in New Delhi after the India-Africa summit of October 2015 in which more than 40 African leaders attended. Yet, there is little visible evidence of substantive achievements having flowed from that summit. Thus, the government may be acutely aware of the need to make this summit more than a showcase event; an occasion that is followed by extensive, sustained engagement and not forgotten with the TV coverage of the event.

The government has been working for several months to ensure that the summit is a spectacular success and not just a milestone event. Ensuring the presence of all the 10 ASEAN leaders for two days is itself no mean achievement. In fact, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is said to have made it clear that there would be a summit only if all 10 leaders came. Their acceptance of the invitation testifies to their desire to add more content to India’s relations with the ASEAN.

What would India discuss with these 10 leaders over two days? Officially, New Delhi would discuss the future of India’s relations with Southeast Asia on the theme of “Shared Values – Common Destiny”. However, the spin is that the summit, while giving a boost to India’s ‘Act East Policy’, would seek to widen the ground for India to counter China’s growing power and influence in the region. In other words — through more defence contracts, trade and investment, and infrastructure building — attempt a regional security architecture in Southeast Asia that allows a leading role for India (with an eye on China).

The success of such a project depends on how India and ASEAN respectively perceive their “shared values” in pursuit of a “common destiny”. While the latter is a given, and there are commonalities between India and the ASEAN, India does not fit the Southeast Asian cultural and social mould, which drives its politics and development model.

India is a robust democracy with a pluralistic political culture where diversity, civil liberties, human rights and freedom of expression are highly valued. Political freedom takes precedence over economic development, although India – like many other Asian countries – is no exception to the authoritarian streak so evident among its ruling class. In contrast, most Southeast Asian nations’ view democracy, freedom and human rights through a cultural prism that is at odds with “universal” declarations, which have more acceptability in India, than in the rest of South Asia.

On the other hand, broadly speaking, economics may be said to have prevailed over politics in Southeast Asia. In the last 50 years, there has taken place an astonishing transformation of the region for bringing about peace, stability, development and prosperity. The ASEAN community is the cause and effect of this outcome, which has given rise to what is known as the “ASEAN Way”. There are disparities within ASEAN as, for example, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam lagging behind Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand in economic and infrastructure development. But, divergences and differences within ASEAN — including socio-economic inequalities, exclusion of certain ethnic groups, extremism and increasing violence — are never allowed to crack the cohesion of Southeast Asian nations.

ASEAN is resolutely united in its goal to improve the lives of its people and this is evident in its economic development, socio-cultural progress, peace and security. The region is kept relatively free of big-power play. Of late, there is a rise military spending and terrorism is a major security concern. Although the South China Sea (SCS) dispute has brought mistrust and acrimony to the region, ASEAN is improving cooperation with China and advocating peaceful resolution and self-restraint. ASEAN appears to have no interest in opening up space for India as a counterforce to balance China in any proposed security architecture in the region.

Therefore, it might be futile for New Delhi to make (absent) China the elephant in the room during the ASEAN-India summit. ASEAN’s relation with China has evolved over the decades and developed many dimensions. No one ASEAN country — not even Vietnam, with which India makes common cause on SCS and has defence cooperation — can inject an element of militarisation in the name of “security cooperation” with India (aimed against China).
In fact, it might be more rewarding for New Delhi to strengthen and deepen its ties with ASEAN in a number of other ways for which opportunities abound.

One, New Delhi should hasten to clinch trade agreements with members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Group. Negotiations have been going on for five years to conclude a pact covering goods, services, investments, economic and technical cooperation, competition and IPRs. The 16-member RCEP comprises ASEAN and India, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Economics is an excellent basis for better bonding with ASEAN and it would be mutually beneficial.

Two, India and ASEAN can gain immensely from more mutual awareness through dialogues going beyond government and business to different parts of India, especially, the northeast, east and the south. Awareness and knowledge about India is quite poor among people in ASEAN countries. Opening up new channels, spaces and possibilities to end this disconnect between the two geographies would be a memorable way to mark 25 years of India-ASEAN relation. For then, people more than politics, security or geopolitics would be at the centre of taking forward shared civilisational and cultural values towards a common destiny.

The author is an independent political and foreign affairs commentator