What’s next for Pakistan?

The French have a saying: ‘the more things change, the more they remain the same’. This fits in perfectly with the election victory of Imran Khan, leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). According to his third wife, the Sufi soothsayer, Bushra Wattoo, Khan is destined to bring in a golden era for Pakistan. The superstitious story about the marriage is fascinating. The truth is Khan’s election was a fixed match by the establishment to end the political legacy and longevity of its bete noire Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) and the Sharif family. Nothing would have changed substantially in the balance of power in civil military relations had Shahbaz Sharif or Bilawal Bhutto (PPP) won. As the ultimate arbiter in Pakistan is the Army, a fact etched in stone, its choice of the elected Prime Minister this time around is Imran Khan with whom the establishment insiders say, has struck a deal in power sharing. The real winner in this exercise of political engineering is the Army notwithstanding the impressive election campaign run by Khan.

In his presumptive policy pronouncements even before the results have been formally declared about a Naya Pakistan, he kept the best bit for the end – India-Pakistan relations and the core issue of Kashmir. Though India was not an election issue in 2013, it became one in 2018 by default. While Khan’s anti-India tirade was directed at the shenanigans of his political opponent Nawaz Sharif, like cosying up to India and undermining the Pakistan Army, at heart, he is no India baiter, his links with jihadists notwithstanding. Cricketer Imran Khan is still the most familiar Pakistani name in India. He has friends and sweethearts with whom he has kept convivial relations. He has attended several leadership summits and political conclaves in New Delhi in which he has come out as sometimes confused but well meaning and not without contradictions. Take his anti-corruption crusade in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa while his party was ruling (now his party has recorded an unprecedented mandate in KP). A Provincial Accountability Commission was established headed by Lt Gen Hamid Khan, a former Peshawar Corps Commander. When he began investigating cases against persons close to Khan, the General was quietly removed.

Khan will initially be preoccupied with domestic reform to recast Pakistan in the mould of a welfare state. At the same time, the Army is unlikely to stir the pot in Kashmir and raise the ante in India-Pakistan relations, two inter-related issues. The ante over the Kashmir issue will only be raised when the UNGA meets in September. The ceasefire in Kashmir sought by Pakistan for creating a conducive climate for elections is for the most part holding and as winter approaches infiltration is likely to intensify to maintain adequate numbers of militants/terrorists to keep the ‘freedom struggle’ alive. That figure has been fixed at around 250 to 300 with militancy almost erased from the Jammu region. The present lull in the unrest is unlikely to sustain after security forces are redeployed from election duties astride the LoC.

Indian security forces have restored their military ascendancy post the Burhan Wani surge but the political void has widened due to the dissolution of the state government. While Governor’s Rule gives greater flexibility to security forces to hunt down militants, it undermines the political credibility of the state and bolsters radicalisation and alienation among the youth. In the absence of any meaningful engagement with stakeholders, the cries for azadi and autonomy will grow louder. Pakistan will not indulge in any mischievous adventures across the LoC as it wants to restore the fig leaf of a responsible state which has abandoned the use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy though its efforts to politically mainstream jihadists has failed.

This is tactical posturing for two reasons. First, the military is under pressure from the US and especially China (for CPEC’s sake) to normalise relations with India as New Delhi has done post-Wuhan with Beijing. Pakistan Army Chief Gen Bajwa wants the revival of the bilateral dialogue which is circumscribed with India’s red lines of ‘talks and terror can’t go together’ and a taboo on meeting the Hurriyat. This leads to the question whether a SAARC summit postponed since 2016 can be held in Islamabad later this year. How can Prime Minister Modi visit Islamabad when the dialogue process has remained suspended since January 2013?

Uniquely for this government, it will complete its term without any Track-I talks with Pakistan. Further, the Modi government has sounded the bugle for the 2019 elections and will not risk a visit to Islamabad before the elections as Pakistan and surgical strikes will be a major campaign issue. Even if there was to be some forward movement on the judicial process of 26/11 which is unlikely, a Modi visit this year to Pakistan can be ruled out and maybe SAARC can also be given another miss. The first window for a visit/meeting between the two PMs theoretically can be on the sidelines of the UNGA if their visits are coordinated and India expresses an intent to do so.  Therefore, in all probability a meeting between the two PMs is more realistic after the Indian elections in 2019. Imran Khan is likely to have a government in place before August 14, his managers have said. He has a long wait before the ice can be broken. 

The author is the convenor of an ongoing India-Pakistan Track II dialogue since 2003. Views are personal.