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Trump-triggered turbulence

Trade wars notwithstanding, India and the US wish to firm up mutual ties in security and foreign-policy domains

Trump-triggered turbulence
Narendra Modi and Donald Trump

The bilateral relationship between India and the US went through a rough patch on June 20 when Delhi decided to retaliate against the unilateral trade tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump on steel and aluminium products imported by his country. In a reciprocal measure that was more symbolic, India slapped a higher range of duties on 29 items imported from the US, largely from the agricultural produce basket, but prudently did not include the Harley Davidson motorcycle.

The Trump-led tariff war has major US trading partners such as China and the EU as primary targets and compared to the billions of dollars worth of tariff increases among these three entities, the India-US trade tariff quantum is about a quarter of a million dollars ($240 mn) and is more about supporting a rules-based global trading system under the WTO framework.

There is little doubt that the US adopting such a protectionist and insular trade posture — ostensibly to protect some domestic manufacturing sectors such as steel — will have a cascading downstream effect. The extent of the damage caused by this Trump-triggered turbulence is indeterminate for now since it is a ‘wrecking-ball’ demolition work still in progress.

The EU and China have already responded with their own counter tariffs on US products and it is choppy waters ahead. But with an annual trade turnover of under $5 trillion, the US leads the global pack and combined with the EU and China, these three entities account for more than a third of the total global trade. Hopefully, the compulsions of globalisation and the corrosive effect it will have on citizen prosperity will compel the politics over trade tariffs to become more prudent and rational, but Trump’s petulance remains unpredictable.

However, even as it is coping with the trade turbulence in the bilateral, India is also seeking to consolidate the relationship with the US in the security and foreign policy domain. A long delayed, inaugural 2 + 2 dialogue between the foreign and defence ministers of both countries is scheduled for July 6, wherein Indian ministers Sushma Swaraj (External Affairs) and Nirmala Sitharaman (Defence) will be hosted by Michael Pompeo (State) and James Mattis (Defense).

The focus will be on “strengthening strategic, security and defense cooperation” as the US and India jointly confront global challenges. Despite the bonhomie in the political domain after the radical nuclear rapprochement in September 2008, the security and defence engagement between the world’s oldest and largest democracies remain hesitant. It is limited to military exercises, devoid of deeper strategic purpose and inventory sales through the G2G (government to government) route.

It merits recall that even before the civilian nuclear agreement was mooted in July 2005, a month earlier in June of that year, then Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his US counterpart Donald Rumsfeld had signed an ambitious agreement on cooperation.

Envisaged as a new framework for the US-India defence relationship for the next 10 years, the preamble dwelt on the need to ‘transform’ the bilateral defence relationship “to reflect our common principles and shared national interests”. The reality is more prosaic and for 13 years, there has been more stasis than traction on both sides and it is only in the last year of the Modi government’s tenure that this dialogue is back on track.

India is coping ineffectually with a range of security challenges and strategic uncertainties and these include inter alia, the rise of China; terrorism with linkages to state sponsorship and radical Islamism; and the proliferation of WMD in its extended neighbourhood. It is instructive to note that all these strands correspond to the US slate on threats/challenges to national security and hence the logic underpinning bilateral defence cooperation.

Yet, India has been hesitant to sign up and impart greater content to its newly formed partnership with the US and this is reflected in a very anomalous arrangement with the Pentagon. India has acquired major platforms such as maritime reconnaissance aircraft (P-8I) and has plans to induct attack and anti-submarine helicopters, but these will not have the more capable communication and surveillance systems (thereby reducing their combat efficacy) since Delhi has been reluctant to sign certain foundation agreements with the US.

Of the three agreements proposed by the US over the last decade, India has signed up to only one — the LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) in August 2016. It is expected that the agreement on communication and information that the US signs with all nations that acquire its military inventory, known by its acronym CISMOA (Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement) will reach consensus in the July 2+2 meeting. Accommodating Indian bureaucratic prickliness and heightened sensitivity about its exceptional status, the acronym will become India specific and read as COMCOSA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) and hopefully, this will enable India to utilise its recently acquired US-origin military platforms at the upper end of their capability spectrum.

The India-US relationship is complex, contradictory and often confounding. The nuclear nettle was a bone in the throat for over three decades and indicated that democracy alone is an insufficient metric for a harmonious political relationship. India chose to be non-aligned through the Cold War decades, but turned to the US in October 1962 for help when it was worsted by China. Concurrently, Delhi and Washington have had divergent views about Pakistan and Iran and the most recent irritant is the issue of Russian military supplies to India.

Prime Minister Modi recently described India’s relationship with the US as a “global strategic partnership” that has “overcome the hesitations of history” and he referred to a shared vision of an “open, stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”.

The outcome of the 2+2 dialogue on July 6 will provide an indicator of how this rich rhetoric will be transmuted into tangible reality. In the interim, beware of the Trump tweet!

The author is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi. Views are personal.

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