Tricky terrain ahead for Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman

Nirmala Sitharaman takes over as the Defence Minister of India at a critical juncture when the threat of local war with Pakistan is one terror strike away, and the border skirmish with China could be a standoff away. What makes Sitharaman the most suitable candidate to head the Ministry of Defence at this stage is that she is no stranger to international affairs and, having been Commerce Minister, she is well versed in the art of negotiating with the global community to secure vital national interests. She comes to the league of the big four (Cabinet Committee on Security) with no baggage and the reputation of a quick learner with a no-nonsense  focus on results. 

A stint in the Ministry of Defence holds a lot of challenges because it has the potential to destabilise the government and nation if affairs are not handled in an astute manner. Therefore, the Defence Minister of a nation is required to be an astute statesman, a strategic thinker of unquestionable integrity and must possess a deep understanding of the process of military capability building. 

She takes over at a point when there are questions raised about defence preparedness, modernisation of defence forces, mistrust between the MoD and the services headquarters. There is also a  perception among the armed forces that the bureaucracy and the current government have not addressed the genuine concerns of the armed forces in the 7th Central Pay Commission and that the political leadership has allowed bureaucracy to further erode the status of the armed forces. Many major challenges lie in front of Dr Sitharaman as she takes over as Defence Minster. A few of them being:

First, restructuring the higher defence organisation to bring professionals on board and making services chiefs or CDS (as and when created) part of policy formulation on matters related to national security. 

Second, India continues to function with obsolete defence structures. Integration of the MoD with Services HQ as recommended by the GoM post-Kargil War is yet to be implemented. The Shekatkar Committee report falls short of meeting the requirement of holistic defence reforms and can at best be described as cosmetic in nature.  India needs its own Goldwater–Nichols Act to pave the way for holistic defence reforms. 

Third, reforms in DPSU, DRDO and Ordinance Factory Board are long overdue and need to be hastened as it is having an adverse impact on capability building. What soldiers want is reliable, modern and timely induction of weapons and equipment to meet the challenges of modern war. These organisations should be responsible and accountable to the armed forces and not to the South Block. 

Fourth, India must aim to develop military capabilities to fight a local war today, theatre war in the next 2-5 years, and a full spectrum war in the next 10 years. However, the ground realities reflect a different scenario. Majority of weapons and equipment held by three services are in their last life cycle. The Army needs basic infantry weapons, mechanised forces require night fighting capabilities, and the artillery requires complete overhaul to achieve minimum threshold capabilities. Loss of lives of men during training and sub-conventional conflict directly reflect inability of the state to equip the soldiers for the task entrusted to them. Air Force is down from 39 squadrons to 32-33 squadrons with a deficiency in spare parts and ammunition. State of naval preparedness is no better, a fleet of 15 diesel engine submarines is grossly inadequate to secure 7,500 km maritime boundary against China’s 67 submarines. Raising of Cyber, Space and Special Forces Command is an operational necessity considering the collusive threat from China and Pakistan. In light of the above facts, resource allocation would be a big challenge in modernising the armed forces.

Fifth, unresolved pay commission anomalies, inadequate housing, poor response of the state governments to grievances of the soldiers and partial fulfilment of OROP directly impacts the morale of the soldiers. The Minister will have to look at these issues with an open mind to resolve them, and not to put them in a long loop of committees that deflect and defer till these issues die a natural death.

Sixth, the Minister will also face a challenge from an unexpected quarter, that is the National Security Advisor. The military, especially the army, has developed a good working relationship with the NSA and collectively they have executed surgical strikes in the Northeast, PoK, and a resolute military stand at Doklam. Thus, who will hold the key for strategic military decisions, the NSA or the Defence Minister? 

The most significant aspect of her responsibilities is that she will have to take a call on whether she would like to handle the ministry through bureaucracy or direct interaction with the services chiefs. 

Most ministers, except Mrs Gandhi, have been accused of running the affairs of national security through bureaucracy, and that has developed a master servant relationship between MoD and services headquarters. The flip side of such a relationship is that political leadership allowed itself to be isolated from the armed forces and the resultant military hollowness reached unprecedented low levels. 

The author is senior fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies