The Marxist conundrum

The Communist Party of India (CPI-M) document on political-tactical line, a relic of 1978, sees no difference between the Congress and the BJP. As such, the party’s official position is not to have any alliance or front with the Congress “in the name of fighting Hindutva”. 

This position was recently articulated by politburo member Brinda Karat in a newspaper article. Her assertion came soon after Sitaram Yechury, a pragmatist Marxist, replaced dogmatic Prakash Karat as CPM general secretary, spurring renewed debate within the party  whether Hindutva or neoliberal economic policies of the BJP and the Congress respectively are more lethal to the communist ideology. Within hours of his election, Yechury had hinted at correcting past mistakes.

For Yechury, correcting past mistakes would mean, inter alia, tweaking the rigid and archaic political-tactical line adopted 35 years ago and syncing the party in tune with the fast-changing socio-political milieu and demographic profile of the country. The document is expected to come up for review at the organisational plenum scheduled to be held by year end. 

Notwithstanding his limited party base, the new general secretary has promised to take the lead in mobilising anti-communal forces in and outside Parliament and that implies increased collaboration with the Congress.

Soon after the Vishakapatnam conference, a rash of media reports speculated that Yechury may adopt a soft Congress line. An apparently stung Brinda Karat promptly scotched rumours of a possible pro-Congress line. In a newspaper article, she said CPM’s struggle against the twin assaults of neoliberal economic policies and Hindutva “cannot be separated as one cannot be identified as more toxic than the other.” In other words, the Congress is not necessarily a lesser evil for the Marxists. This postulation can indirectly benefit the BJP. And that is why, in contrast, Yechury hinted that the BJP is CPM’s principal enemy as the "Modi government has melded communalism and neoliberal economic policy,” considered lethal by the comrades.

However, it remains to be seen how far Yechury can walk with the Congress. While the powerful politburo is packed with Prakash Karat supporters (mostly from Kerala) who are rabidly anti-Congress, the Bengal unit, which facing the brunt of a wily Mamata, is soft on the Congress. 

Can the CPM play a vibrant political role by remaining insular? If it stretched ideological purity to laughable lengths, the party may not be able to have any truck with the Congress as well as regional parties who were derisively dubbed as "bourgeoisie secular parties" at the Vishakapatnam Congress.

If the Marxists continue with their isolationist outlook, how will they, with just nine Lok Sabha MPs and facing a formidable opponent in Trinamool Congress, fight a resurgent pan-India BJP? 

If Modi plays his cards well, he will be at the helm for another nine years or more.

In contrast, the Congress is virtually in the dumps with just 44 MPs and just three key states — Karnataka and Kerala in the south and Assam in the North-East, barring a few tiny states in the North and North-East, in its kitty. After the next round of polls, it may lose some more states. In such a scenario, what is the political logic of seeing both the BJP and the Congress through the same prism?

It is not easy for the CPM to join hands with the Congress after their bitter parting of ways in 2008 when the Manmohan Singh government tried to push the Indo-US nuclear deal, much against the will of the then general secretary Prakash Karat. Yechury and several top leaders, mostly from West Bengal, were against the drastic step of withdrawing support to UPA I on an issue which, they believed, did not have traction with the electorate at large. They were proved right as the CPM’s political and organisational decline, thereafter, saw greater acceleration. 

The second “historical blunder” paved the way for a Trinamool Congress tie-up on the eve of the 2011 West Bengal assembly elections, that proved costly for the CPM. The alliance uprooted the Marxists from the Writers’ Building after 34 years of uninterrupted rule. In the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, the party suffered yet another electoral blow. It secured just two Lok Sabha seats out of 42 LS seats in West Bengal and its overall Lok Sabha tally plummeted drastically over the decade; from 43 in 2004 to 16 in 2009 and just nine in 2014. The party not only failed to consolidate or expand its support base, but its vote percentage shrunk in all states except Kerala. 

Yechury’s real challenge will be wresting West Bengal from Trinamool Congress. The TMC continues its winning streak despite the worsening law-and-order situation and scams clouding the Mamata government. After the eclipse of titans like Jyoti Basu, the party is bereft of charismatic leaders to match Mamata. To wrest power from the TMC, Yechury has to either go in for some covert understanding with the Congress, or at least foil any future electoral alliance between the TMC and the Congress. 

Yechury is in a Catch-22 situation. If the CPM continues to be hostile, the Congress could revive its old ties with TMC before the next polls. Though Mamata parted company with UPA II in 2012, she still keeps her personal line to Sonia Gandhi open. Accepting Sonia’s invitation, Banerjee had, a few months ago, flown down to Delhi to attend the Jawaharlal Nehru centenary celebrations. The TMC also is cosying up to Modi for financial packages and home ministry help. 

The Marxists are in danger of falling between two stools — Hindutva and neoliberal economic policies. Will Yechury be able to find a toehold in between? Some in the CPM believe that Rahul Gandhi could bolster Yechury’s position by pushing the Congress towards a genuine Left-of-Centre mould. That is not an easy suggestion, given the Grand Old Party’s pro-market DNA. Much will depend on the manoeuvrability of Yechury operating from the narrow confines of the political-tactical line. 

The writer is a political commentator