Strategic interests can be achieved by tackling real issues

It is significant that hours after President Donald Trump announced US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or informally called the Iran nuclear deal, originally signed between Iran and five permanent members of the UNSC – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States – plus Germany, alongside the European Union, Massoud Rezvanian Rahaghi, Tehran’s envoy to New Delhi, said if European partners and others stick to promises and commitments under the deal, then Iran too will fulfil its commitments, and oil trade with India will not be affected. With US turning away its back from Iran, Rahaghi said Trump’s decision would have no bearing on India’s engagement in the development of Chabahar. ‘To us, strategic interests need strategic decisions and actions in a timely manner,’ he said significantly.

In what has been a busy time in international diplomacy, realignment of relationships is the theme. But the trouble is they are not watertight, and are often overlapping. Chabahar gives India a strategic access to Afghanistan and a means to bypass Pakistan. But the fact that Iran has also invited China to participate in the project, has raised as many eyebrows as when Russia exhorted India to join OBOR. Praising India’s skill to balance her relations with the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel, Rahaghi said, ‘India has shown that it can move on a tightrope and keep balance. India has relations with the US, Saudi, Pakistan and others, but it does not mean that you cannot cooperate with others.’ 

And now before we examine if the sudden change of India’s stance towards China is the outcome of an epiphany that it cannot sustain its hawkish stand for far too long, we must note that almost coterminous with Modi-Xi friendship meet, what was of greater moment was the peace summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un with his counterpart from South Korea Moon Jae-in as the former became the first North Korean leader to set foot in South Korea since the end of the Korean War in 1953. It is significant that aside from the allegedly great victory over the ‘American imperialists’ in the Korean War, the PLA has only fought two other large-scale international battles: a clear victory over India in 1962 in a border war and a clear military defeat at the hands of the Vietnamese in 1979 after China launched its ‘pedagogical’ invasion of that country. The former is not highly trumpeted in China, perhaps because India is not granted sufficient respect in Chinese strategic affairs to warrant attention. The war with Vietnam is played down for more obvious reasons. As of now, with Vietnam, China abides by the diplomatic formulation of ‘shelving the disputes and seeking common development’. Similarly with India, Beijing is in favour of ‘shelving’ the ‘difficult’ border issue and improving ties in other areas. 

Let there be no sulking over the strategic mismatch of coverage in the world media between the two meets. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Chinese President Xi Jinping had a surprise Wuhan-style informal summit at the northeastern port city of Dalian lately. China may be wary of its declining importance in the Korean Peninsula peace process, should the North Korean leader get too cosy with the US sidelining China. India, on its part, may be wary with the exigencies the North Korean crisis requiring Beijing to reboot its ties both with Washington and with Russia because of its fractious relationship with the West. With an uncertain Trump and his policy of tepid ‘transactionalism’, India has, therefore, no other option, than seeking a ‘reset’ with China. 

But how can India redraw its relationship with China? Ironically, the 1962 war, which China takes too lightly, changed the contours of our relationship with China. For the past three decades, China, unlike India, has consistently built its border infrastructure including railway lines, strategic airfields and roads that can bear the weight of heaviest vehicles, leading right up to the LAC while India has perpetually been tentative. India’s plans to strengthen its defence preparedness by improving the road network near its disputed border with China have failed to make much headway. None knows when a 2006-07 plan envisaging construction of 73 strategic Sino-Indian border roads by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) will be complete. Though the bogey of 1962 is unlikely to repeat, it must learn to deal with likely scenarios including limited coercive struggles in Asia over disputed territories, shipping lanes, basing rights, and so on, and these could always escalate.

If we are serious about a truly Asian century, real issues will have to be addressed. Bargaining for peace from a position of strength always commands greater attention. There is hardly anything that could give one impression that an immediate roadmap would be drawn towards the settlement of border dispute, and until the settlement China would desist from laying a claim to Arunachal Pradesh now or a fingertip in Sikkim next. Besides, the general worry is, when China becomes a ‘maritime’ power and its defence modernisation programme is complete, it may have no need to ‘shelve’ issues. A lasting peace calls for a permanent solution. A strategic peace bid under duress will not work. 

The author is a commentator on geopolitical affairs. Views are personal.