Act first, talk later: Here's how Delhi should have handled mutilation of Indian soldiers

The beheading of two Indian security personnel — one from the Army and the other from the BSF — on Monday by Pakistani attackers near the Line of Control in the Poonch district has led to a predictable mix of anger and anguish across the country. The Defence Minister Arun Jaitley condemned this ‘reprehensible’ act and asserted that “the whole country has full confidence and faith in our armed forces, which will react appropriately to this inhuman act.” This ‘barbaric’ act has been condemned across the board and the Indian audio-visual media has raised the bar of emotive nationalism to a new level and the central question that has been asked repeatedly is: ‘what will India do in response’ — and the extension of this is: ‘could India have handled this beheading of its soldiers differently?’

The short answer to the latter is ‘Yes’ — Delhi could have handled the tragic beheading of its soldiers in a more adroit manner. My preferred scenario is as follows. Imagine the following sequence of events. On Monday morning, Pakistani troops began shelling the Indian post and soon thereafter, their special forces ambushed the Indian patrol and killed Naib Subedar Paramjit Singh and Head Constable Prem Sagar. Their bodies were later mutilated. Once Delhi was apprised of this incident, the higher defence management of the country could have directed the Army to respond in an ‘appropriate’ manner — the Jaitley formulation — and kept a tight lid on the story.  

The beheading and mutilation of Indian troops by the Pakistani army and its non-state affiliates is not a new phenomenon. It may be recalled that this occurred in the 1999 Kargil war and a year later in early 2000, then Pakistani Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf received the severed head of an Indian soldier (from the Maratha Light Infantry) in a widely publicised public event.

To return to the preferred scenario. One presumes that by Tuesday noon the Indian army at the tactical level would have responded in an ‘appropriate’ manner and inflicted a level of punishment on Pakistan and its assets that would make Rawalpindi wince. This is not wishful thinking — the Indian Army has an enviable track-record in imposing costs on the adversary and the post-Uri surgical strike is a case in point.

Delhi would have received the tactical detail by late Tuesday and still kept a lid on the story while seeking options from the military apex about the near future — and how best to raise the cost for Rawalpindi and perhaps Muridke — the HQ of the terror groups directed against India. By today, the ‘appropriate’ response by the Indian army on Pakistani assets — human and material — would compel Rawalpindi to put out its own version of the Indian ‘attack’ and Delhi can then decided how to deal with this ‘story’ and related developments in a more assured and pro-active manner.

The loss of life on the Indian side is the critical reality — and the difference lies in how Delhi could have dealt with the narrative, the media fallout and the societal perception in India. In the current scenario that unfolded from late afternoon Monday — the Indian  security establishment and the Modi government have been shown in poor light and a more astute comprehension of strategic communication — IMHO — could have made the difference, wherein Delhi would have been seen to be more effective than emotive in handling the tragic loss of life and the mutilation that followed.

As noted earlier, mutilation and beheading is applauded in the Pakistani army’s canon — or else an Army Chief would not have bestowed praise in public on the perpetrator who brings the impaled head of an enemy soldier as a trophy. The track record of the Pak Army in East Pakistan in 1970-71 where it engaged in genocide and pretends that it was a minor aberration is part of the make-believe that Rawalpindi harbours about its professionalism and adherence to the unwritten code of valour among soldiers and the conduct apropos a slain adversary.

Thus the next such challenge — which will occur for sure — ought to have a well crafted response matrix where the Indian army should be given the operational leeway to do what it deems ‘appropriate’, while Delhi shapes the narrative so that it has the necessary space to inform the citizen even while increasing the politico-diplomatic leverages needed to constrain the ‘deep-state’ in Pakistan. Avoid the TV wars in Indian studios. This is going to be a long haul and the Modi team needs to assiduously internalise lessons learnt — and not allow the beheading of a soldier to trigger an acrimonious domestic political battle. The adversary is not the spokesperson of the other party!

The author is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi.