Moving beyond Doklam crisis

Exotic settings alone in high summitry do not trigger a change of mindset, though they do create an ambience conducive to easy and relaxed conversation. If nothing else, in the case of Xi-Modi’s informal summit at Wuhan, it will lower the temperature after the 73-day long face-off at Doklam.  

Some success can be claimed by India, but the cost might have been more than the perceived gains. Despite Prime Minister Modi meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping 13 times, their personal chemistry is not like Modi’s with Benjamin Netanyahu or Shinzo Abe. Still, Xi has never hosted another world leader twice outside Beijing, except Modi — the first time at Xian in May 2015. There were no bear hugs, only a friendly handshake. 

It is also true that the Kim-Moon summit of the two Koreas eclipsed the Xi-Modi meeting. The Wuhan summit was categorised informal, though it was accompanied by delegation level talks without any tangible outcome — barring an India-China economic project in Afghanistan — except that a standalone summit was held instead of one on the sidelines of the SCO in China, in June. But the summit, though not outcome oriented, had a strategic, not tactical emphasis.

Both sides, though, had made extensive preparations for the meeting, especially New Delhi, which, according to sources, sought a cool down and Beijing gladly obliged to reduce the mistrust. India’s bonafides were made immaculate by shifting or cancelling a number of national Dalai Lama related events from New Delhi to elsewhere in India.

The sudden transformation in India’s tough strategic stance, post Doklam pleased the mandarins at Beijing no end. On the Chinese side, the Global Times, and other organs of state, which had gone ballistic during the Doklam crisis, welcomed the meeting of the dragon and the elephant. Even the PLA stated that there was a need to stabilise ties between the two militaries.

Prime Minister Modi took a political risk, following a slew of concessions, which the Opposition termed as appeasement of China. This became evident from a tweet by Rahul Gandhi, which asked Modi to raise the issue of Doklam and CPEC. He assured Modi of his party’s full support. On his part, Modi has frequently used Doklam against China as the equivalent of surgical strikes against Pakistan. India’s reaction at Doklam rattled the PLA and the Chinese leadership. This stand-off was related to the boundary questions with both Bhutan and India, where New Delhi took up cudgels on behalf of Thimphu. 

The last time a confrontation of this scale and magnitude took place was at Wandung in Arunachal Pradesh, which led to the landmark visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988 and the historic handshake between him and Deng Xiaoping. Five years later, started the process of peace and tranquility on the border, accompanied by other CBMs, which ended with the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2013. 

At the delegation-level talks, Modi was assisted by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, Ambassador Gautam Bambawale and two interpreters, while Xi’s team consisted of the recently promoted to politburo and former Special Representative Yang Yiechi, Foreign Minister and the new Special Representative for border talks Wang Yi and Ambassador Luo Zhaohui.

Both, during the delegation-level talks and the two one-on-ones between the summiteers, it was agreed that the countries can have relations with whoever they like. For example, China can have iron brother relations with Pakistan, just as India can have a strategic partnership with the US as long as neither country will harm the interests of the other. Maintaining a peaceful border emerged as the prime concern of both the countries.

The border talks between SRs reached a cul de sac some five years ago, but SRs have continued their dialogue on other strategic geopolitical issues. Like India has linked Siachen and Sir Creek with the settlement of Kashmir issue with Pakistan, China has entwined the boundary question with Tibet. The Dalai Lama made his usual conciliatory comments, saying Tibet can be an autonomous part of China and benefit economically and Beijing can draw wisdom from Tibetan Buddhism. But China is not satisfied with the Dalai’s counsel. China is waiting for the Dalai Lama to go away for good and select its own successor, while the Dalai Lama has insisted that only he will choose his successor or Tibetans will elect one. The boundary question will drag on till the war of succession of the Dalai Lama is over.

At the end of the summit, instead of a joint statement, each side produced a statement for the media. The Indian statement was 200 words longer than the Chinese, though the central issues were identical, with some variation in emphasis. The first key point, related to strategic guidance to the military, was to keep the border peaceful. The Chinese statement omitted the words ‘strategic guidance’. Secondly, the two leaders urged the SRs to intensify efforts to seek fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement to the boundary question. 

Gokhale also referred to the principles and parameters of the 2005 agreement. Most observers believe that the Chinese have reneged on Article 7 of the guiding principles that states that settled populations would not be disturbed. The Chinese have stressed on Article 5, which invokes national sentiment that contradicts Article 7, which India upholds. Border talks have been stuck on this point as it involves Chinese claims over Tawang.

RS Kalha, in his book ‘India-China Boundary Issues’, says that China has decided that the present status quo is preferable to opting for a solution. The present stalemate gives China flexibility for exercising coercive options. Still, there is little chance of any concrete steps being taken to resolve the differences on the boundary question.

The author is a founder member of Defence Planning Staff, currently the Integrated Defence Staff. Views are personal.