J&K’s turbulent highway

A lot has been spoken and written about highway control in J&K post both the first and second attempts at use of car bombs by Pakistan sponsored terror groups this year. Everyone is familiar with the first one at Pulwama which tragically caused forty fatalities of CRPF personnel and commenced a spiral of escalation with Pakistan, almost leading to war. The second one at Banihal, less than a month ago, is less known to the public although the media has highlighted it but without too much emphasis on the implications. It was a failed attempt by a lone wolf operative probably backed by a full network of terror. The vehicle along with explosives packed in it caught fire and was burnt down once the detonation mechanism apparently failed; the local terrorist was caught next day attempting to sneak back to the Valley from the south of Pir Panjal. It was enough to send the establishment into a tizzy with possibility of more such attempts.

Just after the Pulwama incident the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) attempted different measures to reduce the footprint of vehicular movement so as to offer lesser opportunity to terrorists to target security forces’ vehicles. This included a high profile announcement of a move to authorise CRPF personnel commercial air travel between Srinagar and Jammu at government expense. A proactive decision no doubt which was much appreciated but reflected little knowledge of the reality of dynamics of security forces deployment, their logistics and movement pattern in Kashmir. After Banihal comes another announcement in aid of securing the movement of personnel in vehicles. This time the National Highway from Udhampur to Baramulla, has reportedly been reserved for movement of only army and police vehicles on Sundays and Wednesdays. No civilian vehicle is being permitted to ply from 4 AM in the morning till 7 PM in the evening on the notified days. It is being hoped that this will completely neutralise the feasibility of car bombs being rammed into a vehicle of the convoy.

As per most media analyses, if the earlier decision after Pulwama was a travesty of understanding of threats in J&K the one reserving days for the army and police movement makes it even worse by its complete lack of sensitiveness. How right is this thinking and are such arrangements justified? A writ petition in J&K High Court against the government direction on restricted movement of civilian traffic is already under examination with the court asking the government to examine more options for secure convoy movement without disturbing civilian traffic. 

There are a couple of facts which need highlighting. The first is that with the MHA decision on air travel it appeared that the CRPF, which functions under the MHA, is the only threatened entity in J&K. Little is it realised that the Army mans the entire LoC and major parts of J&K’s rural countryside; it’s controlling ministry the MoD did not think it fit to offer even a token gesture of permitting its personnel movement by commercial air.   How can personnel under the Government of India, involved in near similar tasks and facing common threats be given different treatment. A practical look at the situation and method of movement will reveal the impossibility of securing personnel through such a gesture. Logistics is far more complicated than mere movement of troops in vehicles. The Army's system of supplies, catering to warlike situations, stretches all the way back to the hinterland and caters for stocking up to variable periods till 210 days, thus entailing a massive movement of convoys for at least six months in summer. The Ladakh region is stocked for the entire winter by using routes for large convoys running through the Kashmir Valley. 

The recent chain of events and the media reporting has led to a mistaken belief that the Jammu-Srinagar convoy of the CRPF is the only major security movement in J&K. Within the Valley almost ten army convoys move every day and each one has personnel, supplies and stores with protection vehicles against possible ambush. The BSF has a few too. Thus both measures by the MHA, air travel by CRPF personnel and earmarking of convoy days with no civilian vehicular move, can only partially ameliorate the threat because there are thousands of other security personnel on the move and many more convoys than just those between Udhampur and Baramulla.

One cannot be entirely critical of the government's decision on earmarked days for convoy movement without any civilian movement. Challenging situations sometimes do demand very uncomfortable decisions. Obviously the Banihal failed car bomb raised hackles of concern on how soon after Pulwama a second attempt was made with impunity. One can imagine the implications if like Pulwama there were once again a large number of fatal casualties. The spiral of escalation with Pakistan may have gone through the roof. However, the question is whether the current security measures have been adequately thought through. Former Chief Minister Omar Abdullah tweeted his observation when he found movement of military convoys on the Srinagar - Uri road on days not earmarked for them. The reality is that military movement in and to the Valley cannot remain restricted. Contingencies being such; terrorist threats, climatic conditions and civilian street turbulence all combine to prevent any rigidity such as fixed days for convoys and other military movement.  The two days on which movement of civilian traffic is banned  are therefore essentially days on which convoys will possibly be dedicated to maximum personnel movement while on other days balance of logistics, not involving groups of personnel in large numbers, will move. This is the only explicable rationale of the decisions recently taken. However, they have caused much bitterness in Kashmir. The problem with our system remains our inability to take the public into confidence or have even a modicum of consultation with it. Some public articulation was necessary to tell the public in no uncertain terms that trends in terrorism result in discomfort to the common people and that full rights of the people cannot be guaranteed under the prevailing extraordinary circumstances. Similar warning through media could also be repeatedly given against stone throwing being done by ISI sponsored mobs to prevent conduct of anti-terrorist operations. The problem in Kashmir is that while alienated people support terrorists they also demand full rights for themselves, little realising that people in proxy conflict zones can rarely enjoy the same rights as people in peaceful areas. 

The above is no justification for the recent decision but a more plausible explanation. With approaching summer, movement of convoys will increase causing more stringent measures leading to enhanced levels of alienation, exactly what the adversary wishes. Can better measures be thought through? Ban on movement of vehicles with less than three passengers is a possible way as suicide mode of execution can ill afford more than a lone wolf. In 2011 on public request the Army moved its convoys from Srinagar outside timings of normal public movement. That measure can, however, decongest the road only near Srinagar. It’s a complex security issue we face and much more deliberation with some flexibility may meet the requirement, at least for some time. 

The author commanded the 15 Corps in Jammu and Kashmir