Islands of Chinese power

When the US aircraft carrier, Carl Vincent, recently made a port call at Da Nang, Vietnam, it attracted international attention because this was the first time that a large contingent of US military personnel landed on Vietnamese soil since the last of the American troops withdrew from that country in 1975. The symbolism of this port call, however, cannot obscure the fact that the United States, under two successive presidents, has had no coherent strategy for the South China Sea.

It was on President Barack Obama’s watch that China created and militarised seven artificial islands in the South China Sea, while his successor, Donald Trump, still does not seem to have that critical sub-region on his radar.
It was just five years ago that China began pushing its borders far out into international waters by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. After having militarised these outposts, it has now presented a fait accompli to the rest of the world — without incurring any international costs.

These developments carry far-reaching strategic implications for the Indo-Pacific region and for the international maritime order. They also highlight that the biggest threat to maritime peace and security comes from unilateralism, especially altering the territorial or maritime status quo by violating international norms and rules.

The Indo-Pacific is so interconnected that adverse developments in any of its sub-regions impinge on wider maritime security. For example, it was always known that if China had its way in the South China Sea, it would turn its attention to the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. This is precisely what is happening now. An emboldened China has also claimed to be a “near-Arctic state” and unveiled plans for a “polar Silk Road”.

In fact, with the US distracted as ever, China’s land-reclamation frenzy in the South China Sea still persists. China is now using a super-dredger, dubbed as a “magical island-building machine”.

China’s latest advances are not as eye-popping as its creation of artificial islands. Yet the under-the-radar advances, made possible by the free pass Beijing has got, position China to potentially dictate terms in the South China Sea. Last year alone, China built permanent facilities on 2,90,000 square metres of newly reclaimed land, according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

In this light, US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea cannot make up for the absence of an American strategy. FONOPS neither deter China nor reassure America’s regional allies.

Indeed, China’s cost-free change of the status quo in the South China Sea has resulted in costs for other countries, especially in Asia — from Japan to India. Countries bearing the brunt of China’s recidivism have been left with difficult choices. Japan, of course, has reversed a decade of declining military outlays, while India has revived stalled naval modernisation. China’s sprawling artificial islands that now double as military bases are like permanent aircraft carriers, whose potential role extends to the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.

Beijing’s growing strategic interest in the Indian Ocean region has been highlighted by the establishment of its first overseas military base at Djibouti, its deployment of warships around Pakistan’s Chinese-built Gwadar port, and its acquisition of Sri Lanka’s strategically located Hambantota port under a 99-year lease. China is also acquiring a 70 per cent stake in Myanmar’s deep-water Kyaukpyu port. A political crisis in the Maldives, meanwhile, has helped reveal China’s quiet acquisition of several islets in that heavily indebted Indian Ocean archipelago.

Against this background, the rapidly changing maritime dynamics in the Indo-Pacific not only inject strategic uncertainty but also raise geopolitical risks. China’s consolidation of power in the South China Sea will have a direct bearing on India’s interests in its own maritime backyard, where Beijing is seeking to chip away at India’s natural-geographic advantage.

To thwart China’s further designs in the South China Sea and its attempts to change the maritime status quo in the Indian Ocean and the East China Sea, a constellation of like-minded states linked by interlocking strategic cooperation has become critical to help institute power stability. There is a consensus among all important players other than China for an open, rules-based Indo-Pacific. Playing by international rules is central to peace and security. Yet progress has been slow and tentative in promoting wider collaboration to advance regional stability and power equilibrium.

For example, the institutionalisation of the Australia-India-Japan-US “Quad” has yet to take off. In this light, the idea of a “Quad plus two” to include France and Britain seems overly ambitious at this stage.

Once the Quad takes concrete shape, Britain and France could, of course, join. They both have important naval assets in the Indo-Pacific. During French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent New Delhi visit, France and India agreed to reciprocal access to each other’s naval facilities, on terms similar to the US-India Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA).

Unless the Quad members start coordinating their approaches to effectively create a single regional strategy and build broader collaboration with other important players, Indo-Pacific security could come under greater strain. For example, if Southeast Asia, a region of 600 million people, is coerced into accepting Chinese hegemony, it would have a cascading geopolitical impact in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Like-minded states must work closely together to positively shape developments in the Indo-Pacific, including by ensuring that continued unilateralism is not cost-free. As Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe, the Indian and Japanese prime ministers, jointly said, unilateralism carries larger ramifications, given the “critical importance of the sea lanes in the South China Sea”. The imperative is to build a new strategic equilibrium, including a stable balance of power.

The writer is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground”. Views expressed are personal.