Is the Chinese Communist Party faltering?

Recent events cast some doubt on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s continued ability to maintain a firm grip on the state apparatus and Chinese society. They point to new vulnerabilities inside the CCP’s domestic security apparatus, possibly hobbling its ability to control the country’s increasingly restive populace.

The US figures prominently in both recent cases—indirectly emphasising the unique nature of the Sino-US relationship.   

The first incident centered on the attempt by Wang Lijun, Chief of Public Security of the centrally-administered Chongqing Municipality, on February 6, to defect to the US. He was denied asylum after a night in the premises of the US Consulate in Chengdu. Occurring just days before Xi Jinping, assessed to take over this October as China’s President, was to visit the US, it stunned the Party and precipitated removal of Bo Xilai, the prominent Party Secretary of Chongqing.

Reports put out anonymously by central Party sources allege that Bo Xilai and Wang Lijun had eavesdropped for months on conversations of important senior central Party leaders. Though officially unsubstantiated, these imply that the central leadership was unaware of the activities of an important provincial leader aspiring to membership of the CCP’s all-powerful 9-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC).

Serious violations of Party discipline obviously went unreported. The development was intensely scrutinised and commented upon for many weeks by millions of Chinese ‘netizens’.    

The second instance equally dramatically burst into public view on April 27, when a blind Chinese human rights activist, Chen Guangchen, released a clandestinely prepared video confirming his escape from house arrest after 19 months. Chen Guangchen, who has been blind since birth, escaped by climbing over the boundary wall of his house in Donshigu village, Shandong province and traveling over 400 kilometers to find shelter in the US Embassy in Beijing.

 He arrived at the US Embassy days before the important ‘US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue’ scheduled for May 2-3, 2012.

Though assisted by an underground network of Chinese human rights activists, many of whom have been arrested or picked up for questioning by Chinese authorities in past days, there is little doubt that Chen Guangchen was assisted by elements in the public security apparatus.

His stay in the US Embassy presented Obama’s Administration with a difficult problem. In an election year Obama cannot afford to be seen as either too ‘soft’ on China, or going slow on human rights issues which the US asserts are central to its policies and values. This moreso when Hillary Clinton referred particularly to Chen Guangchen last November. US Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell arrived in Beijing on April 29, for damage control.

Chen Guangchen also upped the ante. Indicating his preference to remain in China, he posted a detailed, open letter to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao identifying many officials who physically beat his wife and him and demanding that the matter be enquired into and guilty punished.

This, and a video depicting the surveillance activities of public security personnel outside his house, have gone ‘viral’ on China’s internet raising embarrassing issues for China’s leaders when they are preparing for a crucial leadership change-over.

The manner in which the issue has apparently been resolved, with Chen Guangchen leaving the US Embassy on May 2, after a conversation with Hillary Clinton and receiving assurances from Chinese and US authorities, is interesting.

US authorities have publicly assured they would closely monitor whether Chinese authorities are delivering on their promises to Chen Guangchen. If genuinely pursued this widens the window for US monitoring human rights in China leaving open an avenue for others to access the US Embassy, including by communicating grievances through Chen Guangchen.

Latest reports suggest a degree of obfuscation by US authorities, but how the situation develops will be carefully watched in China and various world capitals.

Both cases reveal frayed discipline and fractured loyalties in China’s public security apparatus, despite unprecedented high budgetary allocations of $ 95 billion and $ 111.4 billion in 2011 and 2012, respectively, considerably exceeding the national defence budgets. It will be a matter of acute concern to the CCP leadership.

Controls on the security apparatus were visibly sought to be tightened this March when 3000 public security cadres were sent for “political re-education” and a national conference of heads of county public security organisations was convened in Beijing in April.

Infighting in the CCP’s higher echelons is undoubtedly impacting the efficacy and loyalties of the public security apparatus. Its immediate effect could be to encourage those calling for political reforms and other activists.

Chen Guangchen’s recent actions suggest attempts to motivate others. This could well expand to wider potent protests by China’s restive ethnic minorities. One immediate fall-out could be the dimming of Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu’s chances of elevation to the Politburo this October.