CDS: There’s more work to do

PM Narendra Modi’s announcement that India will, at last, have a Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has been welcomed by the strategic community and the Armed Forces. However, it is well realised that it’s a decision which should have been taken at least 15 years ago. It is also fully known that the complexities involved in making the CDS concept work effectively are hardly likely to make the process smooth or short. Public information on the obstacles, complexities and contentious issues, being relatively poor this is an early attempt to draw interest and explain some of the basics involved.

Individual services among the three armed forces have their own systems, equipment, working environment, value system, training and doctrines. Belief in one’s own service is intense and agreeably necessary to keep high the motivation level and ‘esprit de corps’. Each is a master of his domain and believes that his service is the prime mover capable of delivering national security with some support from the other services. While the common aim of all is the security of India there is often a difference of opinion on how to achieve that. There is a high level of bickering on the allocation of financial resources and threats are perceived with a coloured eye of garnering more for one’s own. However, with development of technology and modernisation, there is an increasing need to optimise resources and jointly work towards the common aim making use of the core competency of each service jointly working in an environment of integration. The realisation about this emerged in the Second World War with single domain knowledge and capability unable to deliver in the face of the increasing complexity of war. 

Temporary structures were set up for higher direction and attempts were made to create seamless systems for joint functioning. Formalisation took place 15 years later with the setting up of permanent organisations to help optimise the plethora of emerging technologies including nuclear weapons. Different nations as per the ethos of their armed forces and the threats perceived, took longer durations to change mindsets and overcome inevitable resistance from within. China’s People’s Liberation Army adopted formal structures of integrated theatre commands only as late as 2016. The US Armed Forces, the most advanced of all, were forced into the adoption of the same through legislation in 1986 after a series of failures and near-failures. The Goldwater Nichols Act provided for a single appointment to direct overall strategy, but provided greater command authority to ‘unified’ and ‘specified’ field commanders; a unique system of integrated theatre commands with different sets of responsibilities vested. The Indian Armed Forces watched the international developments, made feeble attempts at jointness at the tactical level but the real level where it was needed, the strategic remained ignored for long. This was mainly due to the reluctance to give up ‘turf’. 

It’s only after the experience of the Kargil War 1999 that the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) made strong recommendations for adoption of a joint structure for functioning at the highest level with enough expression on the inevitable need for this. The Group of Ministers followed this with an endorsement. However, willingness to go the full way with an empowered CDS placed above the three Service Chiefs and available for single point advice to the government was lacking. In 2001 the government accepted a half-baked measure of setting up a Headquarters (HQ) Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) manned by personnel from all three services as an adjunct organisation to assist the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) whose Chairman was one of the Service Chiefs. The ability to rise above narrow service loyalty remained a problem as before. The KRC had also strongly recommended the induction of uniformed officers into the MoD to give it a truly integrated character and better functional capability but this failed to carry through. Two joint commands were set up with the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Later the Naresh Chandra Committee elaborated on the need for a CDS but the issue continued to languish from committee to committee.

The decision has at last been taken but the structure is yet to be elaborated. Going by the PM’s short announcement it seems as if the CDS will be placed higher to the three Service Chiefs in the pecking order; will the rank be above their four-star status is unknown. It is inevitable that the joint commands and the newly set up agencies catering to the domains of space, cyber and special forces will report to the CDS while the three service chiefs will be responsible for the operational control and logistics of their services. This arrangement is fine but to optimise the decision to its real value the entire structure of the armed forces will finally need to undergo change to integrated theatre command system. This will be a long drawn and sequential process but a decision towards that can be looked forward to now that the CDS has been approved. There are 17 different regional or task-oriented commands of the three services. Can these be integrated to create four or perhaps five? The obstacle to this reorganisation will inevitably be turf loyalty, besides the potential of losing a number of senior appointments. The last is a consideration only because of the dwindling slice of the pie of higher status than the three services enjoy. It can be overcome again with an understanding of the political community. 

The role of the newly set up Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the National Security Adviser may also require a review although with the current high status of the NSA it is only a question of making some adjustment. The concept of single point advice which the CDS is sought to provide may not really optimally work out unless he has power over the three service chiefs. However, it’s best to adopt the system as advocated initially and work towards progressive changes to create a structure for optimal integrated functioning. There will be many faults and many a heartburn but at the end of the day if the nation benefits from them everything will be worth it.

The author commanded the 15 Corps in J&K