#dnaEdit: Supreme Court's rap against frivolous sedition charges

The Supreme Court’s oral observation that “strong criticism of the government” does not constitute sedition or defamation is a reiteration of the extant judicial position. It is important that government officials, police personnel, magisterial officers, and overzealous complainants who rush to the police and courts demanding the imposition of sedition charges on unsuspecting citizens understand this distinction between criticism and inciting rebellion against the government.

However, the Supreme Court took a dim view on the petitioner’s demand that directions be issued to institutional stakeholders to curb the resort to sedition charges. In Kedarnath Singh vs State of Bihar, 1962, the Supreme Court had arrived at the settled position which retained sedition (Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code) as a constitutionally valid provision. However, the Supreme Court introduced an important rider clarifying that a person can be prosecuted only for “incitement to violence or intention or tendency to create public disorder or cause disturbance of public peace”. However, some of the recent instances of citizens being booked for sedition has made a mockery of the Supreme Court’s voice of caution.

There is cause for concern because the wanton imposition of sedition charges has a chilling effect on free speech. In 2015, Tamil folk singer Kovilan, who criticised Tamil Nadu chief minister J Jayalalithaa, was booked for sedition. Last month, Amnesty India found itself in the firing line when the ABVP alleged that anti-India slogans were raised at an Amnesty event to flag human rights violations in Kashmir. Bengaluru police subsequently registered a case. Amnesty claimed that it was an open-door event and it could not be held responsible for the actions of individuals.

Subsequently, a Karnataka court was moved seeking imposition of sedition charges on actor-politician Ramya who said she did not find Pakistan “hell”. Citing these instances, a PIL was moved seeking to restrict the misuse of sedition but the two-judge bench refused to intervene.

The petitioner wanted the apex court to issue directions so that senior police officers would certify that an alleged sedition offence threatened to incite violence or create public disorder. A similar requirement was also to be imposed on magistrates so that orders taking cognisance of a sedition offence would certify that the ingredients of incitement to violence and threat to public order were satisfied. The petitioner also sought the review of all pending cases and the dropping of those cases where the apex court-imposed riders on sedition were not satisfied.

The Bench wisely responded to these demands by noting that the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) sanctions the procedure to be followed by the police and courts and it would be counterproductive to issue a different set of directions for just one category of offence.

If the Supreme Court were to issue different sets of directions on the procedure to be followed in different offences, it would undermine the Cr.PC and would only breed procedural clutter and confusion. NCRB data indicates that 30 sedition cases were lodged in 2015 against 47 in 2014. For those campaigning to repeal sedition, it is important to go beyond the highly publicised incidents and statistics. To gain a better understanding of sedition, it is important to study each of these individual cases lodged in 2015 and before.

The National Law University of India’s comprehensive report on death-row prisoners was a commendable academic effort that can be replicated for sedition cases too. It is not enough to denounce sedition for being a colonial era law. What is required is quality research on legal issues, and not the espousal of liberal views, bleeding heart arguments or activism, to convince judges and lawmakers of the need for progressive laws.