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A saga of botched opportunities

The two factors which have held back Kashmir are the Abdullahs’ dubious legacy and Article 370

A saga of botched opportunities
SHEIKH-ABDULLAH,-NEHRU,-SARDAR-PATEL

In this first of the two-part series, the author demystifies the blackmail of the Abdullahs
 
On October 26, 1947, Kashmir became a part of India under unusual circumstances. Just over a month before, Maharaja Hari Singh had made an offer to join India but the offer was spurned by Nehru, whose first condition was the release of Sheikh Abdullah from jail. Hence, what could have been a normal accession was made extraordinarily eventful.

The accession, though, was unconditional; in fact, the instrument of accession was not any different from those signed with other princely states like Hyderabad and Junagarh. On October 27, Indian troops landed in Srinagar; the Sheikh helped to organise private armies to complement the Indian Army. The result was that the Pakistani ‘non-state actors’ were pushed back significantly, even though a good portion of the state to its west and north still remained occupied by them.

While Hari Singh continued to hold the title of the king for a few years succeeding Kashmir’s accession to India, the Sheikh was installed as the PM of Kashmir. Now, there is a marked difference in the way Singh and Sheikh viewed Kashmir’s accession to India. While Singh largely saw it as unconditional, Sheikh reiterated that it was provisional and would be subsequently decided by the will of the people. Sheikh’s stand led him to constantly bargain with and blackmail the Indian establishment for favours which were exceptional and which only ensured that Kashmir’s integration remained incomplete.

So while the hasty accession of Kashmir into India was the result of Pakistan breaching its Standstill Agreement with Maharaja Hari Singh, the cost of accession was borne by India forever after.

Hence, Article 370 of the Constitution, which came into force on January 26, 1950 was the first official compensation which India had to pay for being Kashmir’s saviour two years ago.

It is interesting to note that as early as 1953, Nehru had realised his folly of backing the Sheikh. In fact, by then Sheikh had revealed his true colours and was increasingly seen as an embarrassment by the Indian leadership. His hobnobbing with Pakistan to extract more advantages from India, was an open trick.

And hence, in August 1953, anticipating that Sheikh would launch a fresh ‘azaadi’ move and break free from India, he was dismissed as PM by Dr Karan Singh, the then Sadr-e-riyasat (Constitutional Head of Kashmir). Sheikh’s deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was installed as the PM of Kashmir. What followed was a second official compensation in the form of Article 35A, brought in through a Presidential Order in 1954.

Now it is interesting to note that the 10 years when Sheikh was in prison were perhaps the best years for Kashmir. The new PM, even though he steadfastly guarded Kashmir’s special status, proved himself to be a deft administrator. The state took rapid strides in education and improving public life. Even though Sheikh’s supporters continued their propaganda under a new front formed in 1955 called Plebiscite Front, Bakshi dealt with law and order issues with an iron hand. And Kashmir saw one of its most peaceful phases during this time.

However, the shady friendship between Nehru and Sheikh had Nehru resurrect the latter’s political career, just months before Nehru’s death in May 1964. Sheikh’s jail term had made him wilier and this time, he wouldn’t budge from his demand of plebiscite. Nehru died soon but his successors were left with new problems to battle.

Soon after Nehru’s death in 1964, Sheikh was interned from Kashmir for 18 months and his Plebscite Front was banned from taking part in the elections. Soon after, the National Conference was dissolved and merged with the Indian National Congress, in a marked centralising strategy.

And hence, with the Congress ruling both at the Centre and the state, it was perhaps the best opportunity to integrate Kashmir. But Indira Gandhi did not have the resolve of Narendra Modi. She instead allowed a much-mellowed Sheikh to make another comeback as CM in 1975. While Sheikh was relatively sober in his last few years, his return as CM ensured that his legacy of blackmail politics continued.

The perils of this devious brand of politics started showing up by the mid 80s. The dubious 1986 accord between Sheikh’s son Farooq and Nehru’s grandson Rajiv, after a particularly tumultuous equation between the parties, shocked the people of Kashmir. They rightly felt cheated. It sent a clear message — that the politics of both the Congress and NC was nothing but mere posturing and that they cared two hoots for the concerns of Kashmiris.

This led to a massive consolidation of fundamentalist Islamic forces, who got together to fight the elections under Muslim United Front (MUF). The elections were rigged by National Conference and Farooq returned to power.

It did not take time for many leaders of the MUF to overnight pick up arms against India. And hence, the uncertainty and chaos of 1987 was to turn into armed militancy of the worst kind after 1987. What followed was the grimmest chapter in the history of Independent India and need not be reiterated.

The key to the Kashmir conundrum lies in the repeated, fishy dalliances between the Nehru and Abdullah clans over decades. What could have been an easy accession in September 1947 was complicated by Nehru. What followed was endless blackmail by the Abdullahs for being a part of India.

While in other parts of the country, inept leaders exploited the veil of ‘secularism’ to cover up for their administrative failures, in Kashmir the Abdullahs quietly stoked secessionism to hide their abysmal track record in infrastructure, jobs and education.

The writer is a well-known author and spokesperson for Mumbai BJP. Views expressed are personal.

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